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Saito: Tax Coordination

TAX COORDINATION
Blaine G. Saito*
ABSTRACT
The United States implements much of its social policy through its
income tax laws. The Code is rife with tax expenditures for education,
housing, community economic development, retirement savings, and
health care to name a few. But the IRS is not an agency with expertise
in any of these areas and developing such expertise would draw
resources away from its core tax administration mission.
Commentators have thus called for a series of changes from turning
these tax expenditures into outlays for these programs to divesting the
IRS/Treasury of most of the administration of social policy tax
expenditures. Yet, given American politics and the institutional
structure of the federal government, these moves are both unlikely to
occur and unwise.
This Article suggests a different and more promising route. It argues
that agency coordination between the IRS/Treasury and other federal
agencies, or in other words—tax coordination—would improve
administration, management, and potential outcomes of these social
policy tax expenditures. Drawing on the well-established literature in
administrative law and public administration regarding agency
coordination, this Article shows the benefit of tax coordination. It then
presents case studies where the IRS works with other agencies to
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administer certain tax measures for social policy. Finally, it employs
insights from the public administration literature to recommend
institutional and managerial changes that would make tax
coordination successful.
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INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) and its associated regulations
have conquered large swaths of the social policy world. Within them,
there are important social policy measures for addressing health care, 1
housing,2 education,3 poverty,4 and retirement,5 just to name a few. In
many ways, tax is at the center of the policy world. This expansion has
led to the adage that if someone really wants to make important social
change, they need to have at least a basic understanding of tax.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and its parent agency, the
Department of the Treasury (Author refers to these two agencies
collectively as the IRS/Treasury), administer the Code. Although the
IRS/Treasury are filled with dedicated employees, their main focus
and specialty are in the area of tax law and the collection of revenue
rather than implementation of the myriad social policy areas now
contained in the Code. But as tax expenditures extended their tentacles
into other areas of policy making, the IRS/Treasury are now also
tasked with becoming experts in other social policy spheres. Failure to
expand expertise would result in the improper administration and
program management of these tax expenditures. But given the
declining budget of the IRS,6 administering and running effective
1. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 36B (refundable premium tax credit under the Affordable Care Act), 106
(exclusion from gross income of employer-sponsored health insurance), 125 (cafeteria plans like health
care flexible spending accounts), 213 (itemized deduction for extraordinary medical expenses), 223
(deduction for contributions to health savings accounts for those on high deductible health insurance
plans).
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 42 (low-income housing tax credit), 121 (exclusion from gross income of gain
from the sale of a principal residence), 163(h)(3) (allowance of deduction of mortgage interest on principal
residence).
3. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25A (Lifetime Learning and American Opportunity Tax Credits), 117
(exclusion from income of qualified scholarships), 127 (exclusion from income of employer paid
educational assistance programs), 221 (deduction for interest paid on educational loans).
4. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 24(d) (refundable portion of child tax credit), 32 (earned income tax credit).
5. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401 (special tax treatment for defined benefit pension plans and
employer-sponsored direct contribution retirement plans), 408 (individual retirement accounts), 408A
(Roth individual retirement accounts).
6. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2019, at
23–33,
24
fig.1.3.2,
25
fig.1.3.3
(2019),
https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/ARC19_Volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/55PF-5FX5] (noting the precipitous
decline of about 20% of the IRS budget in inflation-adjusted dollars between FY 2010 and FY 2019, and
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program management of these social policy tax expenditures takes
vital resources away from the IRS’s core tax collection, audit, and
taxpayer service functions. The IRS is thus forced to choose between
spending its budget on more revenue agents to audit taxpayers and
hiring or training revenue agents to become experts on social policy
programs.
In light of this difficult choice that the IRS/Treasury must make,
commentators have offered two solutions. One is to eliminate social
policy tax expenditures and turn them into actual outlays of funds
administered by agencies involved in social policy. 7 The other is to
keep the tax expenditures in the tax law but have them entirely
administered by agencies that run similar social policy programs.8
But both of these calls are misguided. Entirely eliminating these
social policy tax expenditures from the Code is frustrated by politics
and the institutional arrangements of Congress.9 Eliminating the roles
of the IRS/Treasury from administering social policy tax expenditures
runs a risk that other social policy agencies would need to develop
expertise in understanding and interpreting the tax laws in-house, or

a reduction of average full-time equivalent employees from 94,711 in FY 2010 to 73,554 in FY 2019);
Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, How the IRS Was Gutted, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 11, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-irs-was-gutted [https://perma.cc/3PBF-9K7W] (noting the
decline in the IRS budget of $2 billion in 2018 dollars from 2010 to 2017 thereby decreasing audits and
enforcement). In turn, these declines have harmed taxpayers’ abilities to work with the IRS and resolve
problems. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., supra, at 25–28.
7. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); infra
Part I.
8. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Pursuing a Single Mission (or Something Closer to It) for the
IRS, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 169 (2016).
9. See generally SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011) (noting that most social tax policies involve
private actors and are difficult to change); KIMBERLY J. MORGAN & ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, THE
DELEGATED WELFARE STATE: MEDICARE, MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL POLICY (2011)
(noting that delegating governance of social programs to private actors and state governments satisfies
Americans who want to keep government programs without increasing the perceived scope of
government); CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (arguing that tax expenditures are a good political tool because
they cater to various interest groups and help Congress enact policy); infra Part I. Indeed, the budget of
such tax expenditures has increased on the order of 96% during the period from 1991 to 2013, according
to work done by the conservative leaning Tax Foundation. William McBride, A Brief History of Tax
Expenditures, TAX FOUND. 1 (Aug. 22, 2013), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff391.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VVY-PQEZ].
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they risk making serious mistakes.10 Furthermore, because the
IRS/Treasury are experts in the tax laws, they also have a broader view
of how various aspects of the Code interact with one another. Without
their active management, there could be complicated and problematic
divergences, resulting in impossible-to-comply-with tax directives or
significant confusion.11
This Article argues that agency coordination between the
IRS/Treasury and another set of agencies in the federal government is
a promising solution to this problem.12 This coordination between the
10. See Blaine G. Saito, Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 39 VA.
TAX REV. 451, 507–08 (2020) (discussing problems when a grant program that replaced a tax credit
program for renewable energy was given entirely to a subagency of the Treasury unfamiliar with tax
concepts and where evidence of the IRS’s help was lacking). In most cases involving grants under Section
1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the only reason that problems were found
was because a project was sued for an increased grant amount, and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Tax
Division performed a deeper dive on the projects’ finances and basis and found serious problems that led
toward counterclaims. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603,
123 Stat. 115, 364-66 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 48 note) (providing grants to people in lieu of tax
credits if they install facilities that produce alternative energy); see, e.g., Bishop Hill Energy, LLC v.
United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 540, 541–42 (2019) (plaintiff applied for a grant under Section 1603 for a
wind facility, then the Government challenged the amount of the grant by arguing that there was
insufficient evidence for the transaction’s cost basis), aff’d sub nom. Cal. Ridge Wind Energy, LLC v.
United States, 959 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Indeed, in one case, funds seemed to have gone out from
one entity in a controlled group of entities only to return to the originating entity in a round trip that
increased basis. Cal. Ridge Wind Energy, LLC v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 757, 762 (2019), aff’d, 959
F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
11. See Saito, supra note 10.
12. Much of the agency coordination literature comes from administrative law. See generally Jacob E.
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201
(discussing jurisdictional statutes of administrative agencies); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011) [hereinafter Marisam, Duplicative Delegations] (discussing statutes that
duplicate delegations to several administrative agencies); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency
Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (arguing for more
coordination by administrative agencies via the Executive Branch); Jason Marisam, Interagency
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013) [hereinafter Marisam, Interagency Administration]
(analyzing how agencies work with each other); Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency
Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015) [hereinafter Shah, Uncovering Adjudication] (providing
examples of how executive agencies work with each other); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 211 (2015) (showing how pooling resources across agencies gives the Executive Branch more
power over administrative agencies); Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV.
1961 (2019) [hereinafter Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination] (analyzing how Congress enables
administrative agencies to coordinate with each other). Of course, agency conflict is also a key part of the
administrative law literature and serves as a pushback or at least a rethinking of agency coordination. See
generally Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1375
(2017) (analyzing recent interagency conflicts); Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers,
129 YALE L.J. 378 (2019) (arguing that Congress’s delegation of certain authority to administrative
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IRS/Treasury and other federal agencies is what this Article calls “tax
coordination.” By working together with other agencies with greater
expertise, the IRS/Treasury can likely better monitor social policy tax
expenditures, manage them, and leverage resources. Agency
coordination has the potential to allow these tax expenditures to better
meet their social policy goals while maintaining some coherence in the
tax laws.
But tax coordination appears to be used sparingly, and few have
discussed it. Many tax expenditures geared toward social policy do not
have any coordination effort between the IRS and another agency. 13
This Article is the first to map how agency coordination can lead
toward better administration of the tax laws and social policy tax
expenditures. It puts into conversation three bodies of scholarship: the
tax law and policy; the well-developed agency coordination and
conflict literature in administrative law; and the work in public
administration and management on how to make coordination
successful.14 The insights drawn from these previously siloed
discussions promise new paths that improve the administration,
management, and performance of social policy tax expenditures.
Overall, this Article takes a positive view on agency coordination as
an effective way to address the matter of tax policy. Coordination will
not always be easy and magically solve these problems. Agencies
sometimes do not want to work together and often have little incentive
to do so.15 Sometimes there can be conflict. Though conflict can be
productive, improper turf wars can undermine coordination. 16 The goal
of a coordination effort is to harness conflict and differing viewpoints
toward some common goal.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that tax
coordination is a useful solution to the problems involving social
policy tax expenditures. It explains why removing these programs
agencies is intended to provide checks and balances on these agencies). Public administration provides
certain practical structures for agency coordination. See generally EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING
AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See infra Part I.C.
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from the tax laws and out of the IRS/Treasury’s management is
unlikely to succeed. It then shows how tax coordination with other
agencies is a useful solution to this problem by drawing on the
administrative law literature.
Part II provides three case studies of coordination between the IRS
and other agencies. The case studies are chosen based on the
effectiveness of their coordination. They are, in increasing order of
efficacy, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and
the Premium Tax Credit (PTC) of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The
case studies provide narratives as to the development of each of these
areas, the coordination efforts, and some key takeaways.
Part III then builds on the discussions in Parts I and II to provide
recommendations and a framework for providing successful agency
coordination in the tax sphere. It outlines key institutional changes that
could aid tax coordination. Drawing on public administration
literature, it discusses managerial methods to ensure coordination
success. The goal is to provide a range of options for policymakers to
implement tax coordination.
I. TAX COORDINATION TO IMPROVE TAX EXPENDITURES
Tax coordination, or agency coordination with regard to tax
expenditures that effectuate social policy, is perhaps the best means to
muddle through an unideal situation. For better or for worse, tax
expenditures are likely to continue as a means by which we institute
social policy, and calls to move toward direct grants or eliminating the
IRS/Treasury’s roles here are misguided.
This Section first addresses the critiques of both tax expenditures
and the IRS/Treasury serving as an administrator for social policy
programs. It then shows how the literature and other ideas around
agency coordination can help improve the administration and program
management of tax expenditures for social policy. It closes with a
rejoinder against critiques of agency coordination, showing that in this
particular sphere there is less applicability.
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A. Why We Need to Keep the IRS/Treasury Involved
The tax policy literature frequently bemoans the IRS/Treasury’s
involvement in social policy through tax expenditures. The usual
objections for social policy tax expenditures are that use of tax
expenditures undermines a well-functioning tax system.17 The
IRS/Treasury administration of social policy tax expenditures leads
toward problematic mission creep that hampers effective tax
administration. But the IRS/Treasury are ill-suited to administer and
manage these programs.18
This Article rejects these approaches. Tax expenditures for social
policy are a part of our reality. Given the political and institutional
reasons discussed below, the failure to enact social policy through tax
expenditures may mean that many social policy programs would cease
to exist. Although in a first-best world there would be limits on what
social policy tax expenditures fall within the Code based on the
institutional capacities and expertise of the IRS/Treasury, we do not
have that. The goal then should be to find ways to make these tax
expenditures work better, given this constraint.
This Part first discusses when a social policy tax expenditures make
sense in the first-best scenario based on the institutional capacity of the
IRS/Treasury.19 It then examines why politics and institutional
arrangement mean that unreasoned social policy tax expenditures are
enacted and live on.20 Lastly, it argues that maintaining some presence
of the IRS/Treasury in administering these programs, despite their
mismatch, is still important.21

17. For a discussion of the debates around the comprehensive tax base and tax expenditures, see David
A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955,
967–82 (2004). In this area, they not only outline the concerns that critics of tax expenditures raise about
a well-functioning tax system but also the rejoinders, and they note that there is a severe definitional
problem because one person’s tax expenditure is another person’s key calculation of the comprehensive
income tax base. See id.
18. Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1729–30, 1760
(2014).
19. See infra Part I.A.1.
20. See infra Part I.A.2.
21. See infra Part I.A.3.
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1. Functional Analysis of the Tax System as Delivery Mechanism
As noted above, there is a long debate about the ideal income tax
base and what constitutes a tax expenditure. 22 This Article, for
convenience, takes the more traditional and greater accepted view
associated with prominent tax law scholar, Stanley Surrey, when
defining a tax expenditure. 23 But ultimately, this debate is beside the
point.
In an ideal world, social policy tax expenditures, even using the
Surrey-type definition, may be justified if they are the best means for
that delivery. As fellow tax scholars, David A. Weisbach and Jacob
Nussim, observe, as organizations grow, they often form specialized
divisions.24 In trying to determine the task to assign to a division, the
corporation needs to look at a division’s capacities and assign tasks
that are complementary to those in the division’s underlying
capacity.25
The government is no different. 26 The IRS as an agency, because it
has to specialize in the collection of income taxes, gets quite good at
measuring income.27 Income measurement is often key for the delivery
of many direct social policy benefits to the poor. 28 Thus, because of
the IRS’s capacity to collect income taxes, it has the potential to serve
as a highly efficient means for the delivery of social policy programs.29
But Weisbach and Nussim note that there are tradeoffs.30 The IRS
may not be great at offering in-kind benefits.31 It also is not responsive
to sudden swings in income within a year because it measures income
on an annualized basis.32 Thus, they conclude that, for example, the
22. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17 (summarizing this discussion).
23. See id. at 972–73 (summarizing Surrey’s tax expenditure ideas as any item of deduction, exclusion,
or credit that deviates from the normal income tax base).
24. Id. at 985, 987, 992.
25. Id. at 992.
26. See id. at 992–97 (discussing the divisions in the government context).
27. Id. at 1001.
28. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17, at 1000–02.
29. Id. at 1001–02.
30. E.g., id. at 1011 (noting overpayments of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) may increase
participation in the program while reducing overpayments may increase administrative costs).
31. Id. at 1012–16 (discussing how the IRS would run the Food Stamp Program if it was integrated
into the tax system).
32. Id. at 1016–17.
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government should continue to administer the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) outside of the tax system, but the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) works well in the tax laws.33
Weisbach and Nussim thus provide a compelling means to avoid the
messy debate of tax expenditures. Their model, while focused mainly
on functional differences between the IRS/Treasury and other
agencies, could have space for tax coordination in limited
circumstances. But far more policies are shoehorned into the tax
system and the IRS/Treasury than Weisbach and Nussim’s model
would suggest. That problem stems from politics and other
institutional structures.34
2. Politics and Institutions
Essentially, hard-nosed political situations and structures will keep
social policy in the tax laws and keep the IRS/Treasury as the
administering agency.
Social policy tax expenditures solve a key political paradox in the
United States. People tend to support providing more help to the poor
and other key redistributive policies, but they also want smaller
government.35 Social policy tax expenditures solve this dilemma of
desires for more and less government simultaneously. 36 Tax
expenditures also serve as a means of compromise between the ever
more polarized liberals and conservatives.37 Liberals get expanded
social benefits while conservatives can claim “smaller government”
through reduced taxes.38

33. Id. at 1026–27.
34. Indeed, Weisbach and Nussim explicitly cabin this matter. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17, at
965–66.
35. METTLER, supra note 9, at 17; MORGAN & CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 35, 37–45.
36. METTLER, supra note 9, at 17.
37. Id. at 16; see HOWARD, supra note 9, at 179 (noting that tax expenditures appeal to both liberals
and conservatives because they can serve to help needy individuals, subsidize third-party actors, and limit
the size of government programs).
38. METTLER, supra note 9, at 17; MORGAN & CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 35, 37–45; see also Daniel
N. Shaviro, Can Tax Cuts Increase the Size of Government?, 18 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 135, 136 (2005)
(discussing how reducing taxes can actually increase the size of government by shifting wealth
distributions from younger to older generations).
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This situation means that the constant calls for removing social
policy tax expenditures and turning them into actual outlays could lead
toward the elimination of many social policy programs. Indeed, even
in the age of rising left-leaning ideas, the tax laws still seem to be a
way politicians enact social policies.
Another key political problem has to do with Congress as an
institution using the tax laws to implement benefits of social policy
from the great power of the two tax-writing committees: the House
Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on
Finance.39 They pass legislation on a somewhat regular basis. Both
Committees also get additional analytical support from the staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).40
These committees are also the locus of oversight over the
IRS/Treasury. The IRS/Treasury officials also work closely with Ways
and Means, Finance, and JCT in talking through administrative
matters, implementing the tax laws, and developing potential changes
to the statutory language. Thus, a move to completely remove the
IRS/Treasury from the administration of social policy tax expenditures
or a move toward having actual outlays would face pushback from
these committees because it would erode their power and control.
Another congressional structure makes eliminating social policy tax
expenditures difficult. That structure is the dual process for enacting
programs that require the expenditure of funds. Most programs for
social policy are often done not as mandatory spending, whereby the
spending happens automatically, but in the domestic discretionary
budget. That means that there is a two-step process for
implementation. First, Congress must authorize a program. 41
39. HOWARD, supra note 9, at 179–80; see MORGAN & CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 46–47 (describing
how Congress implements social policy by requiring coalition-building and involving interest groups).
Any revenue raising measure must go through these two committees as well as numerous other areas of
policy. H.R. REP. NO. 116-721, at 89–90 app. I.B (2021) (outlining the jurisdiction of the House
Committee on Ways and Means); S. REP. NO. 116-19, at 1 (2019) (outlining the jurisdiction of the Senate
Committee on Finance).
40. I.R.C. §§ 6405, 8001-8005, 8021-8023.
41. BILL
HENIFF
JR.,
CONG.
RSCH.
SERV.,
RS20371,
OVERVIEW
OF
THE
AUTHORIZATION-APPROPRIATIONS
PROCESS
1,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS20371/13 [https://perma.cc/LT8Z-3SDD] (Nov. 26,
2012); see HOWARD, supra note 9, at 179–80.
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Authorization outlines the operation and general rules for the program,
but it does not provide the actual funds for the program. 42 Instead, it
provides suggested funding levels for the program. 43 To get enacted,
authorizing legislation must go through at least one committee in each
chamber, go to the floor of each chamber, have differences reconciled,
receive final approval from both chambers, and get presented to the
President, who then signs it into law.44
Once authorizing legislation is enacted into statute, however,
Congress must annually appropriate the funds for these programs.45
The appropriation requires following a similar path, starting this time
in the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and ending at
the President’s desk.46 Appropriated amounts, though, can often
deviate lower than the authorizing legislation’s suggestions.47
Sometimes, additional restrictions on the use of the appropriated funds
arise.48 Finally, the appropriations process is conducted annually,
meaning that Congress has to go through this passage and presentment
process every year.49 For many social policy programs, that can create
significant problems of underfunding or potential hamstringing based
on Congress’s whims.50
Tax expenditures for social policy avoid these matters. Most
importantly, they need to just go through the enactment process once
and through powerful committees to boot. When placed in the Code,
they operate without the need for appropriations, distributing the

42. HENIFF JR., supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. See HOWARD, supra note 9, at 179–80.
45. See id.
46. HENIFF JR., supra note 41, at 2; see id. at 180.
47. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW: CHAPTER 2: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2-61 (4th rev. ed. 2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/201911/675709.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UU4-EEPL].
48. Id. at 2-65.
49. A Brief Guide to the Federal Budget and Appropriations Process, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC.,
https://www.acenet.edu/Policy-Advocacy/Pages/Budget-Appropriations/Brief-Guide-to-BudgetAppropriations.aspx [https://perma.cc/UJ2W-4SFY].
50. JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44582, OVERVIEW OF FUNDING MECHANISMS IN THE
FEDERAL
BUDGET
PROCESS,
AND
SELECTED
EXAMPLES
1,
3,
9–10,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44582/9 [https://perma.cc/S9LD-TS8S] (Feb. 5, 2021)
(explaining that Congress determines the funding for social policy programs with discretionary funding).
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“funds” as tax reductions automatically. 51 Thus, this procedure means
annual appropriations laws are unnecessary for the benefits to flow. 52
This situation then allows tax expenditures not to fall to the whims of
not receiving any appropriations in a given year or the situation
whereby the amount authorized in law is lower than the amount
appropriated, as so often happens with domestic social policy spending
programs.
Thus, both the American political landscape and the institutional
structure of Congress make the idea of moving away from social policy
tax expenditures to direct grants or moving administration of tax
expenditures outside of the IRS’s/Treasury’s purview highly unlikely.
3. The Advantages of the IRS/Treasury as an Administrator
Beyond political measures, there are reasons why using the tax
system and having the IRS as a key administrator, along with the
Treasury, can aid in the administration and management of social
policy tax expenditures. There are certain automaticity and data
collection advantages that the IRS has over other agencies.
Additionally, as the expert in the tax law and the tax system, the IRS
has some unique expertise that aids in the operation of social policy
tax expenditures.
First, there is the issue of data and automaticity. Although far from
perfect, the IRS still has a lot of important data regarding people’s
income.53 Such information is important and determines who qualifies
for key benefits. 54 Although the information that the IRS collects
regarding income is done annually, receiving annual income
information is often helpful in administering many social policy

51. Tax Expenditures, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/tax-expenditures
[https://perma.cc/JVK8-ZD2V].
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., Can the IRS Get My Bank Account and Financial Information? The Short Answer: Yes.,
H&R
BLOCK,
https://www.hrblock.com/tax-center/irs/audits-and-tax-notices/can-the-irs-get-myfinancial-information/ [https://perma.cc/298Z-EEV8] (noting that the IRS can know someone’s bank
account, investment account, or transactions through various tax forms).
54. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17, at 999–1001.
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programs.55 And even in situations when annual reporting may lag too
much for immediate needs, the IRS’s annual information collection on
tax returns can provide additional self-reporting of income information
in the middle of the year.56
Additionally, most Americans have contact with the IRS by filing a
return or by being required to file a return to claim benefits like EITC. 57
The use of the tax return process allows many poor individuals to avoid
the stigma of applying for public benefits. 58 They do not have to submit
to lengthy interviews and probing questions up front before qualifying
or recertifying for benefits.59
Removing the IRS as a player in the administration of social policy
tax expenditures means that the benefits of high touch points and
information gathering would disappear. Another agency may need to
collect duplicative data and may not have systems as good at managing
that information.60 Exporting the data collection functions out of the
IRS also loses the benefit of reducing the stigma associated with
claiming benefits.61 Instead, these other agencies will have to chase
after individuals to enroll in certain social programs and do intrusive
checks to ensure their continued qualification on a periodic basis.62
Beyond those structures, the IRS/Treasury also have unique
expertise that aids in the administration of social policy tax
expenditures. The IRS/Treasury employ numerous accountants,
lawyers, and economists who understand tax issues, trace where the
money flows, and study how certain tax policies create certain

55. See id. at 1024–26 (comparing the need for responsiveness for the EITC and Food Stamp
Program).
56. See Self-Employed Individuals Tax Center, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businessesself-employed/self-employed-individuals-tax-center#QuarterlyPayments [https://perma.cc/SV6V-T459]
(Jan. 19, 2022) (allowing self-employed individuals to file taxes in quarterly payments throughout year).
57. Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 828 (2014).
58. Id. at 828–29.
59. Id. at 828.
60. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17, at 1001–02 (noting the IRS’s advantages in measuring
income needed for a lot of social policy and welfare programs); Tahk, supra note 57, at 829–30, 832 (also
noting the ease of administration with the IRS and its data).
61. Tahk, supra note 57, at 828–29.
62. Id. at 828; see also Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17, at 1004–05, 1005 tbl.1 (noting the high
under provision rate of food stamps).
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effects.63 Such abilities, if deployed effectively, can aid in not only
running these programs but also in monitoring them in a way that
provides information to Congress and other policy actors about the
efficacy of these programs. Furthermore, the ability to trace where the
money flows, when used properly, can help eliminate matters of waste
and fraud in these programs. 64 Indeed, the capacity of the IRS to
undertake such goals, even in light of its recent budget cuts, likely
exceeds the capacity of other government agencies in this regard.65
Following the money and determining tax liability are core functions
of the IRS.66
Furthermore, because the IRS/Treasury manage the entire tax
system, they have a broader systemic view of the tax laws and
policies.67 Changes in one area in terms of statute, regulation, or basic
management can have potential knock-on effects in other parts of the
tax laws. The IRS/Treasury can thus do a better job than other federal
agencies at keeping everything operating harmoniously within the
Code. Additionally, the IRS/Treasury know the language of tax, and
many other agencies lack that ability. Keeping the IRS/Treasury
involved can help limit directives that run at cross-purposes with the
tax laws and reduce unintended consequences that may arise if a
non-tax expert tinkers with one tax provision that has effects on other
parts of the tax system. 68
Thus, there are some good reasons to keep the IRS/Treasury
involved in the administration and management of social policy tax
expenditures outside the political realm. Given the political problems
63. Careers at Our Bureaus, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/about/careers-attreasury/careers-at-our-bureaus [https://perma.cc/3V9R-XMZ8].
64. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-49SP, FRAGMENTATION, OVERLAP,
AND
DUPLICATION:
AN
EVALUATION
AND
MANAGEMENT
GUIDE
(2015),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-49sp.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2DU-D9TB].
65. E.g., Chart Book: The Need to Rebuild the Depleted IRS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
2–4
(July
2,
2021),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/7-2-21tax-chartbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SW9-V2RG] (discussing how IRS’s budget was 19% below its 2010 budget).
66. The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/the-agencyits-mission-and-statutory-authority [https://perma.cc/R9JY-A4QA] (Sept. 8, 2021).
67. Id.
68. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1150–51 (discussing several consequences resulting from
agency coordination, including duplicative services, increased costs for compliance, disputes, and
monitoring, reduced policy effectiveness, and increased bureaucracy).
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and the need to have tax experts play a significant role in tax policy,
the question is how to get these programs to work better given that the
IRS is not an agency with expertise in social policy issues. It is here
that agency coordination helps.
B. Tax Coordination’s Benefits
The literature on agency coordination from administrative law
provides the framework as to why tax coordination can be superior to
either removing these functions from the IRS/Treasury or building up
the capacity within each agency. This Part explains some of the most
salient benefits of tax coordination.
1. Expertise
Perhaps the most common reason for spurring interagency
coordination is the use of multiple agencies with expertise to address
a complex question.69
Many policy problems today are increasingly complicated and
systemic.70 They require deep but varied sets of expertise. Interagency
coordination capitalizes on and pools expertise across agencies to
create public value to address such complicated problems. 71 It allows

69. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-1022, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: KEY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY COLLABORATIVE MECHANISMS 13–14 (2012)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-1022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6T3P-BGRA]; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1184–85.
70. See IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 9–10, 10 fig.2 (discussing the
complexities of climate change and how it is systematically leading toward coordination); Marisam,
Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 184–85 (stating that the growth of the bureaucracy and the
increasingly complicated regulatory problems required drawing on multiple agencies’ expertise); Freeman
& Rossi, supra note 12, at 1169, 1171–72 (discussing the joint Environmental Protection Agency-National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (EPA-NHTSA) rulemaking on greenhouse gas emissions for cars
and noting that the contributions of each agency’s expertise in not only creating a harmonized rule but
also balancing fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies and safety concerns).
71. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 8–10 (discussing interagency coordination, which Bardach refers to
as collaboration, as a means for increasing public value); Renan, supra note 12, at 212–13 (noting that a
type of coordination directed by the Executive, which Renan calls pooling, “augments capacity by mixing
and matching resources dispersed across the bureaucracy. . . . [I]t enables the executive to combine one
agency’s expertise with legal authority allocated to another.”); Marisam, Interagency Administration,
supra note 12, at 190–91 (discussing how it is often rational for agencies to coordinate with each other to
help with tasks that fall outside of the traditional expertise).
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agencies to leverage their historically-developed expertise and
viewpoints to address a complex problem or policy situation. 72
With a social policy tax expenditure, the IRS could talk to and work
with another agency that has particularized social policy expertise.
That cooperation could lead to better regulations, administration, and
program management of those tax expenditure programs.
Furthermore, with tax expenditures for social policy, it is important
to get a sense not only of how a particular tax expenditure affects a
particular social policy sphere but also whether other parts of the Code
affect that sphere.73 For example, in addressing housing policy,
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is a key tax expenditure
aimed at increasing the supply of affordable rental housing.74 But to
get a full view of housing issues and housing markets, one must also
consider the mortgage interest deduction, which provides a benefit to
homeowners, and place-based incentives like the New Markets Tax
Credit, which seeks to revitalize many neighborhoods where the
LIHTC projects are located. 75 Thus, in coordination, the IRS/Treasury
can provide other agencies information about the tax expenditures that
affect their policy sphere, and those other agencies could provide the
IRS/Treasury with expertise that helps it better understand and manage
the tax expenditure programs.
Drawing on multiple agencies’ expertise in interagency
coordination also allows for the airing of different viewpoints. 76
Agencies working alone often get into groupthink or a status quo
72. See Renan, supra note 12, at 213–14 (discussing how the Department of Homeland Security and
the National Security Agency coordinated with each other to address cyberthreats).
73. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-622, TAX EXPENDITURES: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST
TO USE BUDGETING AND AGENCY PERFORMANCE PROCESSES TO INCREASE OVERSIGHT 23–25, 24 fig.6,
25 tbl.1 (2016) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE OVERSIGHT], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao16-622.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWW8-UCYB] (noting the need for agencies outside of the IRS and
Treasury Office of Tax Policy to identify tax expenditures for their goals, despite the limited efforts
undertaken in this sphere).
74. Low-Income
Housing
Tax
Credits
(LIHTC),
HUD
USER,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html [https://perma.cc/R248-UNBB] (calling the LIHTC
the “most important resource for creating affordable housing in the United States today”).
75. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (allowing homeowners to deduct their home mortgage interest). See generally,
e.g., Michelle D. Layser, How Place-Based Tax Incentives Can Reduce Geographic Inequality, 74 TAX
L. REV. 1 (2020) (discussing the wide array of place-based tax expenditures).
76. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1184–85 (showing how agencies are forced to consider
information and other matters that they normally would overlook).
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bias.77 Using an interagency mechanism, particularly with agencies
that have differing missions and expertise, brings forward additional
viewpoints.78 These viewpoints can help avoid certain blind spots and
lead toward better policy outcomes.79
Social policy tax expenditures fit this mold. The IRS/Treasury, as a
tax agency, focus on accounting, finance, and economics issues.80
Other agencies in social policy are oriented more toward benefit
delivery and management. Leveraging these differences can give rise
to divergent viewpoints that can establish better ideas on how to
implement various social policy tax expenditures.81 Additionally,
because the IRS/Treasury operate outside of the social policy sphere
and another agency operates outside of the tax world, they may each
provide a useful outsider’s perspective to the other agency’s realm.
2. Limiting Cross-Purposes and Conflicting Commands
Another important reason for coordination, and one related to the
idea of pooling expertise, is that it can prevent cross-purposes. Those
are policy purposes and rules that conflict with one another in a way
that makes it difficult to comply with the policy.82 Having
cross-purposes not only make compliance impossible or difficult but
also mean that one policy solution actively undermines another. 83 Such
a neutralization not only may result in costly outcomes for those
outside the government but also may undermine the very policy
purposes of those programs.84
Interagency coordination helps to make sure that as policies
develop, they are done in a holistic way that prevents cross-purposes
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1384–85 (noting that having different agencies
contribute and enter into conflict has the potential for “enhancing expertise and ensuring that all points of
view are heard”).
80. Strategic Goals Overview, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/understanding-the-plan/strategicgoals-overview [https://perma.cc/PNL9-VWA4] (May 5, 2021).
81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1150–51 (discussing cross-purposes, inconsistent or
duplicative rules, and other discordant regimes that can arise without coordination).
83. See id.
84. Id.
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that undermine outcomes because the agencies are aware of what each
one is doing working on a particular policy. 85
If the IRS/Treasury implement and administer tax expenditures
alone, they may not be aware of how those tax expenditures interact
with other policies that address a particular problem in social policy. 86
Thus, for example, in health care, the IRS/Treasury may promulgate a
regulation that runs counter to a policy goal of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and the regulations it produces. But the flip side is also
true; other agencies may not see how their interpretations may run
contrary to the rules of the tax system. They also may not understand
that their attempts here create a mechanism that is unenforceable or
incalculable for the IRS in its ability to determine the proper benefit
amount to collect taxes.
Coordinating together across agencies then would allow a greater
level of harmonization. It would balance the various needs and allow
for more rational policy outcomes that work well together.
3. Resource Efficiency
Tax coordination can also improve resource efficiency by reducing
the costs of redundancy or the costs of attempting to centralize
functions.
Building redundancy may have advantages, but overdoing it is
expensive and may cause an undermining of the overall ability of an
agency to meet the very set of problems for which it was designed in
the first place.87 The inefficiencies grow when there are cross-purposes
and policy conflicts between agencies. 88

85. Id.
86. See OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE OVERSIGHT, supra note 73, at 26 (noting that agencies often
lack an understanding of how tax expenditure programs may affect their core agency goals).
87. See Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 190 (noting the outsourcing of some
tasks that “fall far outside the agency’s traditional expertise”); see also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12,
at 1182 (noting that there are costs for gathering information to make decisions, which coordination can
help reduce).
88. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1150–51.
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Interagency coordination serves as an efficient solution because the
agencies that coordinate do not have to recreate capacity within the
agency.89 They instead turn to their expert partners. 90
In the area of tax expenditures, resource efficiency gains are useful.
The IRS/Treasury have significant resource constraints, as shown by
budgets declining in real-dollar terms.91 By working with other
agencies that have expertise, the IRS/Treasury then do not need to
create mini-federal government agencies from within, thereby saving
costs.92 Additionally, this move limits the concerns of mission creep. 93
The IRS/Treasury would work on these tax expenditures but in a way
that plays to its core mission and capabilities, while the other agency
contributes in a manner that plays to its expertise, strengths, and
mission.
Agencies with which the IRS/Treasury coordinate also benefit.
They too do not need to duplicate the tax expertise and some of the
associated capacities, such as accounting. They can also rely on some
of the tools that the IRS/Treasury have, such as audit and enforcement
mechanisms. Thus, in the end, coordination not only potentially
reduces overall resources but also could even create a multiplier type
of effect when the sum is greater than its parts.
4. Limiting Capture
Agency coordination can reduce the risk of capture.94 Frequently,
agencies can get captured by the parties they regulate or benefit. 95 It
89. Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 190–91.
90. Id.
91. Kiel & Eisinger, supra note 6.
92. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1184 (noting that coordination can “help agencies to
manage overlapping agency functions”).
93. Cf. Spencer Woody, “Mission Creep” Leads to Costly Duplication and Ineffectiveness, NAT’L
TAXPAYERS UNION FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ntu.org/foundation/detail/mission-creep-leadsto-costly-duplication-and-ineffectiveness [https://perma.cc/7KE9-MCTK] (defining mission creep as “the
process by which an agency gradually expands its defined mission statement to make it more inclusive of
new issue areas and activities” and noting how “mission creep” affected the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention when it established several subdivisions).
94. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1186–87 (discussing how coordination reduces capture
and arbitrage).
95. See id. at 1186 n.265 (discussing how during the financial crisis from 2007 to 2008, financial
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leads frequently to rent-seeking behavior and ineffective policies that
favor certain interests.96
Interagency coordination on complex questions reduces capture risk
because there is often more than one center to which a regulated party
must appeal.97 One cannot merely capture the IRS/Treasury or another
agency. Furthermore, it is generally unusual for any nongovernmental
actor to have the relationships to capture agencies with varying
missions.98 Given the unique position of the IRS/Treasury as opposed
to other programmatic agencies in social policy, capture risks can
decline.
C. Coordination Concerns
While some herald agency coordination in administrative law,
others raise concerns about it, noting that it is rife with problems. 99 But
in tax coordination, where we have the IRS/Treasury coordinating with
other agencies to administer social policy tax expenditure programs,
some of these concerns are either inapplicable or could be addressed
by proper structuring and management. Below are some of the
common concerns raised with coordination.
1. Indeterminacy, Turf, and Unproductive Conflict
One particular problem is that agencies’ efforts to work together
could devolve into a situation of indeterminacy, fights over turf, and
other forms of unproductive conflict. 100

institutions approached federal agencies, such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, for
sympathetic rulings, which may have undermined the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s ability to
regulate mortgages and banks).
96. See id. at 1185–86.
97. Id. at 1186.
98. See id. (discussing how coordination can help reduce capture by having agencies hold each other
accountable and how inserting another agency with other perspectives can limit an interest group’s
influence).
99. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
100. See Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 210–11 (defining indeterminacy and
outlining its problems); BARDACH, supra note 12, at 178–80 (discussing turf conflicts between agencies
and how the division may be complicated).
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Conflicts can arise because agencies that attempt to coordinate may
have viewpoints that are too different to come to an agreement.101
Agency cultures may not mesh. 102 Furthermore, people working in
these agencies that are attempting to coordinate may view the other
agency’s people as stupid, lazy, or venal. 103
One result of these conflicts is indeterminacy. Indeterminacy is
when the coordinating agencies are unable to reach an agreement on
policy.104 The result is either paralysis or an awkward compromise
struck without much reason. 105 Indeterminacy undermines one of the
core goals of interagency coordination—reaching a unified solution to
a complex policy problem.106
Conflict may also create problematic turf battles. Agencies may try
to avoid coordination or resist it because they are concerned about
losing turf to another agency. 107 Thus, the agencies involved could
seek to undermine any interagency coordination efforts.
In tax expenditure policy, these are often the largest concerns. The
IRS/Treasury typically do not coordinate with other agencies unless
explicitly directed to by Congress. Even then, as the case studies below
show, there can be problems. Part of this outcome may stem from the
fact that the tax system itself is viewed as special, and there are
numerous provisions within it that implement policy with a social
outcome that is unfamiliar to other agencies.108 Another reason for the
lack of coordination is that taxation existed for a period of time outside

101. See Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 210–11 (presenting the case study of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) determining
nutrition labeling and their clashing viewpoints on the matter, which they resolved in an awkward
compromise).
102. Id. at 198.
103. See BARDACH, supra note 12, at 183–84 (discussing ethnocentrism in coordination and the
problems of this us-versus-them viewpoint).
104. Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 210.
105. Id. at 210–11.
106. See IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 13–15 (determining that it is
important to bridge organizational cultures to ensure effective coordination and have ways to work
together).
107. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 178–80.
108. Hickman, supra note 18, at 1718–23 (introducing and questioning tax exceptionalism, particularly
when the law is no longer undertaking a revenue-raising function).
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the usual ambit of administrative law and administrative agencies. 109
Taxation also has an air of complexity that frequently frightens others
working in the government.110
But one can overcome these problems with effective management,
good institutional structures, and proper coordination tools. Although
not perfect, some of these ideas, as described in Part III, can increase
the probability of success of harnessing the benefits of coordination.
2. Loss of Useful Competition
Another concern about interagency coordination is that coordination
may actually undermine the benefits of having agencies in an
adversarial relationship. 111 Removing such conflict could undermine
effective policymaking.112
Often, having agencies in conflict can produce useful results. 113
Agencies, when thrust into a policy space, may compete to claim it
more effectively.114 Those who move quickly can often claim primacy
on the issues, while those who slack lose out on the opportunity to
shape the matter. 115 The competition between the two agencies could
create a policy outcome that is closer to what Congress and the
President intended when enacting the policy into statute. 116
But in the tax expenditure context, competition is unlikely to
occur.117 Again, part of this problem stems from the fact that tax is
treated as special. Most other agencies do not want to touch tax matters
109. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance
with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1795–99
(2007) (describing the reasons that the IRS and Treasury moved away from administrative law norms).
110. See id. at 1772.
111. Gersen, supra note 12, at 212–14 (discussing how agency competition helps bring them more in
line with principal actors, Congress, or the President); Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1384–85
(noting that conflict provides better outcomes on social welfare grounds, enhances expertise, and ensures
voices are heard).
112. See Gersen, supra note 12, at 226 (noting that exclusive jurisdiction undermines competition
between agencies).
113. Id. at 212–14; Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1384–85.
114. Gersen, supra note 12, at 213.
115. Id. at 213–14.
116. Id. at 212–14.
117. See Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 12, at 229–30 (noting that agencies may have
desires other than to compete for a policy space).
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with a ten-foot pole, and many of them are unable to identify many of
the tax expenditures that hit their core functions. 118 Thus, the unusual
lack of competition in social policy tax expenditures derives from the
choice of using tax expenditures to effectuate a policy goal.
Furthermore, the IRS/Treasury often do not want to compete with
other agencies to assert control over social policy regulatory spaces.
Indeed, even where there are no congressional mandates for another
agency to coordinate with the IRS, as described below, the
IRS/Treasury sometimes still neglect social policy tax expenditures. 119
The reason is that, given their great resource constraints, the amount
of money at stake in some of these tax expenditures compared to the
overall tax system, and the need to maintain their core tax collection
and administration mission, undertaking competition in an unfamiliar
social policy sphere is just too resource intensive for the
IRS/Treasury.120
Thus, right now, competition is non-existent, and it is unlikely to
arise. Indeed, as noted above, the IRS/Treasury have little knowledge
of what other agencies are doing in a social policy sphere.121
Furthermore, many other social policy agencies have no sense of the
number of tax expenditure programs that affect their core missions.
The lack of knowledge means that productive competition is unlikely,
and instead, coordination may be necessary to develop an airing of
different views on how to manage social policy tax expenditures.
Another argument against coordination is that agency competition
can also help reduce the risk of groupthink. Often a policy problem run
by one agency can lead toward a certain way of approaching it, that
inhibits the agency’s ability to see solutions outside of the agency’s
normal mode of operation. Competition helps to broaden expertise by
generating more information and wider participation of interests. 122
Coordination, on the other hand, may lead toward a groupthink in the

118. OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE OVERSIGHT, supra note 73, at 23–30, 24 fig.6, 25 tbl.1.
119. See Saito, supra note 10, at 484–85 (discussing how the IRS does not share data with Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) such that HUD could manage the LIHTC program).
120. See Kiel & Eisinger, supra note 6.
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1386.
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coordinated entities whereby agencies that coordinate reinforce
judgment errors.123
But tax coordination may not be as much of a problem in creating
groupthink as many of the agency competition commentators
suggest.124 When agencies have similar missions and biases,
groupthink develops. But a negative correlation on that dimension
leads towards coordination with different viewpoints; the coordination
becomes a means to manage the competition in a more productive
way.125
In the tax expenditure space then, coordination likely will not lead
toward problematic groupthink. The IRS/Treasury have very different
ideas and missions from many other programmatic agencies that work
in a social policy sphere.
3. Separation of Powers
Many critics of coordination note that coordination can raise issues
of separation of powers in two dimensions—between Congress and the
Executive and between agencies to which Congress explicitly decides
to pit against each other.
Often, the Executive coordinates agencies to work together, drawing
on expertise to reach the gains mentioned above when it is not
statutorily commanded or prohibited. 126 But the dark side of this
coordination, as Harvard Law Professor Daphna Renan explains, is
that it leaves Congress out of the picture. 127 The Executive can mix
and match to build capacity that Congress could not dream of, and
123. Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 212–13.
124. Compare Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1385–86 (arguing that conflict, not coordination,
is better at providing expertise and different viewpoints), with Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at
1182–85 (arguing that coordination helps agencies not overlook differing viewpoints and incorporate
different expertise). Indeed, the benefits of conflict and coordination espoused by Farber and O’Connell,
on the one hand, and Freeman and Rossi, on the other, have a great deal in common by seeking a more
diverse set of voices in the decision-making process and better generating information. Farber &
O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1385–86; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1184–85. Both works hint that
there are qualifications to conflict or coordination that make them more or less effective.
125. Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 213–14 (noting that the common biases
are less problematic when agencies have negatively correlated biases).
126. Renan, supra note 12, at 214.
127. Id. at 216–17.
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Congress is left reactive. 128 Coordination can also call into question
the initial arrangements that Congress intended in delegating tasks to
a certain agency, resulting in bureaucratic and coalitional drifts.
Executive coordination efforts also frustrate Congress’s attempt to
conduct oversight and control spending and resources.129 Thus,
coordination could lead toward greater power for the Executive against
that of Congress.
But again, the tax sphere mitigates some of these concerns.
Currently, the fact that sometimes the IRS/Treasury solely administer
these programs stems less from a desire to cabin Executive power and
more from the fact that Congress continues using the Code as the
mechanism to deliver social policy. 130 As noted above, Congress’s use
of the Code to deliver social policy arises from political and
institutional arrangements. 131 Pooling or coordination then is less
Executive aggrandizement. Instead, it is an attempt at supporting the
IRS/Treasury’s ever-growing portfolio of social policy
responsibilities.
Additionally, when Congress has a grasp on the complexities of
administration of these social policy tax expenditures, it will
sometimes put coordination into the statute itself. 132 Indeed, as shown
below, this mechanism may actually be the best means for the
IRS/Treasury to work with other agencies. 133 This situation then
pushes against the narrative of Executive power and speaks more
towards a greater locus of power in Congress.

128. See id. at 213, 216–17, 255–56.
129. See id. at 257–67 (providing examples of bureaucratic drift, coalitional drift, the muddling of
committee oversight functions, and mechanisms to overcome funding constraints).
130. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17, at 1001–02 (illustrating the administration of the EITC
by the IRS).
131. See generally METTLER, supra note 9 (discussing the “submerged state,” which involves policies
that benefit private actors and fall within the tax system); MORGAN & CAMPBELL, supra note 9 (discussing
how Congress used delegated governance to enact social policy such as the Medicare Modernization Act
of 2003, through which private insurance companies can negotiate coverage prices with prescription drug
manufacturers); HOWARD, supra note 9 (discussing several tax credits to show how Congress administers
several social programs).
132. See Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, supra note 12, at 1966–69 (describing how Congress
delegates to multiple agencies thus avoiding involvement from the President).
133. See id.
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Moreover, Congress sometimes explicitly divides a policy sphere
between two agencies, each with distinct roles, creating a
subconstitutional separation of powers to constrain the Executive. 134
Usually, this separation is heightened when Congress creates an
explicit division between an executive agency and an independent
agency.135
With regards to subconstitutional separation of powers among
agencies, many of these tax expenditures were not created with any
intent to divide power among agencies. Instead, it was by an accident
of using the Code to implement social policy. 136
Furthermore, tax coordination is far more likely to arise between
executive agencies. Many independent agencies do not occupy these
regulatory spaces in social policy program. Thus, generally, the
strongest version of concerns is relatively easy to avoid.
Overall, many of the theoretical objections to tax coordination fall
away when one examines some of the particularities of using the tax
laws to implement other social policies.
Although tax coordination has great potential, it is not always easy
to implement. The next Sections examine attempts at implementing
some form of tax coordination through case studies with some
takeaways. This Article draws on lessons in these case studies, along
with those lessons in other administrative law and public
administration literature, to develop a broader set of ideas that
improves the likelihood of success in tax coordination.
II. TAX COORDINATION CASE STUDIES
There are instances of coordination success as well as problems with
the IRS/Treasury and other agencies. These cases show that the
IRS/Treasury can coordinate effectively under the right circumstances.
But too frequently, coordination is fraught or, more commonly,
134. Jacobs, supra note 12, at 381. Jacobs focuses on the separation between the Department of Energy,
an Executive branch agency, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, an independent agency.
See generally id. at 405–27.
135. See generally id. at 415–27.
136. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 17, at 1001–02.
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ignored. Problems with administering both the tax laws and social
programs result, as noted above.137
This Part comprises three case studies, which show different degrees
of coordination effort and success. The first is the LIHTC, which has
significant problems because of its total lack of coordination. 138 This
situation of no coordination or even communication between the
IRS/Treasury and other executive agencies in a policy space is
seemingly the norm. Second is ERISA. 139 The story in ERISA is one
of accidental coordination foisted by strange congressional dynamics
that the agencies grouped together over time into a moderately
workable outcome. Third is the Premium Tax Credit (PTC) of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA).140 This story is one of intense
coordination and success.
A. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: Failure Without
Coordination
The LIHTC is a credit that provides for the creation of affordable
rental housing.141 It is the largest supply-side intervention in
housing.142 Instead of the government building housing projects, the
LIHTC allows the engagement of the private sector to develop such
housing. The program is a joint effort by the federal government, state
and local housing financing agencies, developers, and investors.143
Yet among those parties, one is missing: the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), the lead agency on housing issues.
HUD itself coordinates with other agencies like the U.S. Department

137. See supra Part I.C.
138. See infra Part II.A.
139. See infra Part II.B.
140. See infra Part II.C.
141. I.R.C. § 42; Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), supra note 74.
142. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), supra note 74 (noting that the LIHTC program
allocates approximately $8 billion annually).
143. I.R.C. § 42; Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), supra note 74; Saito, supra note 10, at
461–63.
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of Agriculture on affordable housing supply- and demand-side
interventions.144 The question then is why this arose as the case.
Though a total lack of coordination or even communication between
the IRS/Treasury and HUD seems odd, it is generally common for
many social policy tax expenditures.145
1. The LIHTC’s Operation and Missing Coordination
I.R.C. § 42, the statute for the LIHTC, does not have any command
to coordinate or even consult with HUD.
The statute functions as follows. The federal government, through
the Treasury and the IRS, grants non-refundable credits for the
production of low-income rental housing. 146 In general, the credits
cover about 70% of the costs of producing new low-income rental
housing units.147 Projects get a stream of credits over a ten-year
period.148 There are requirements as to the rental restrictions, imputed
income of tenants, fair housing matters, nondiscrimination on the basis
of source of income, and habitability. 149 But the IRS does not directly
administer the program by selecting projects.
Instead, state agencies, called Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs),
receive the credits based on their population size.150 The HFAs
determine which projects receive credits based on a plan, called a
Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP).151 QAPs account for state and local

144. See, e.g., Alicia Mazzara, Federal Rental Assistance Provides Affordable Homes for Vulnerable
People in All Types of Communities, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1–2 (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-9-17hous.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DH67-GC5Z]
(discussing how the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and HUD coordinate on federal rental
assistance).
145. See Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a
Better Way, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 47–49 (2011) (noting that conservation easements lack this
arrangement and citing a few limited examples in the energy context).
146. I.R.C. § 42(a).
147. Id. § 42(b). What expenses count are found in I.R.C. § 42(c)-(d). Id. § 42(c)-(d).
148. I.R.C. § 42(f).
149. Id. § 42(g), (i); Treas. Reg. § 1.42-9(a) (2021).
150. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.42-14(a)(1)(ii), (c) (2021).
151. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.42-17(a)(3) (2021).
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needs for affordable rental housing, though the statute has some
requirements for a QAP.152
Developers then, if an HFA awards them the credit for their project,
use the credit as a means to attract investment.153 Many of the
developers do not have much tax liability to offset, so investors seek
the credit to offset their tax liabilities. 154 Many investors are banks that
also get credit under the Community Reinvestment Act. 155 The
developers then build the project with the investors’ capital, and the
investors receive the credit over ten years.156
Both the complicated procedure and the fact that it is such a large
housing program naturally raise HUD as a partner. But that is not what
happens. Part of this unusual circumstance came as a result of the
enactment of the LIHTC.157 The provision was added as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. 158 The law cut many tax expenditures,
including many related to affordable housing creation. 159 The
House-passed bill did not have the LIHTC.160 But prior to its
consideration in the Senate, housing advocates pushed the Senate to
develop the LIHTC, and that made it into the final bill and into law. 161
This move at a later point in the process meant that perhaps
coordination or sharing regulatory space with HUD was not fully
considered.
Thus, HUD currently plays little role in the LIHTC, even though the
LIHTC is a program vital to HUD’s policy space.162 That is not for
lack of trying. HUD has frequently expressed an interest in working

152. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)-(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.42-17(a)(3). For statutory QAP requirements, see
I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(C).
153. Saito, supra note 10, at 461–63.
154. Id. at 461–62.
155. Id. at 462.
156. Id.; I.R.C. § 42(a), (f)(1).
157. See Saito, supra note 10, at 457–58 (discussing LIHTC’s legislative history).
158. Id. at 457.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 458.
161. Id. at 457–58.
162. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-330, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: JOINT
IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION COULD HELP ADDRESS WEAKNESSES IN OVERSIGHT 6, 23, 34 (2015)
[hereinafter JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION ], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-330.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Y7Z-4BNZ].
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with the IRS/Treasury. 163 But given the lack of statutory requirements,
the IRS has seemingly rebuffed the attempts. For example, the IRS
refuses to share any information with HUD pursuant to I.R.C. § 6103,
saying it is not a tax administration matter. 164 There seems to be little
incentive or effort from the IRS side to reach out to HUD to work with
them and perhaps leverage HUD’s knowledge and resources.
2. Problems of Management
Many of the problems associated with the LIHTC stem from
problematic incentives.165 But if monitoring and management of the
program were better, some of those incentives would likely get
corrected. The fact that HUD is not involved means that the program
suffers from some managerial problems.
First, the key toward determining what projects get the credit and
where they are located falls with each state’s QAP.166 Unfortunately,
the IRS does little oversight of QAPs. There are two sources for this
problem. To start, the IRS lacks the expertise to do effective program
management and monitoring of QAPs.167 It requires significant
expertise on various aspects of housing outside of the usual tax
collection and finance expertise of the IRS.168 Thus, the IRS cannot
effectively undertake reviews of QAPs or other housing-related
matters. The result is that many QAPs favor increasing housing in
areas that are of low intergenerational mobility and in ways that
increase residential racial segregation.169 Furthermore, because the
IRS sees this program as outside of its core tax collection mission, the
IRS is unlikely to attempt to recreate any internal expertise for

163. Id. at 23, 40–41.
164. Saito, supra note 10, at 484. I.R.C. § 6103(h) allows sharing of tax return information for tax
administration purposes, but joint administration of a tax expenditure program is generally not considered
tax administration by the statute, unless there is a specific exemption. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(4), (h); see also
Saito, supra note 10, at 484 n.159.
165. Saito, supra note 10, at 485–89 (discussing problematic incentives that provide bonuses that lead
toward segregation, low-mobility neighborhoods, and limited sanctions to state HFAs for poor QAPs).
166. Id. at 458–59; see also I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(C) (outlining the various requirements for QAPs).
167. Saito, supra note 10, at 478–80.
168. Id. at 478–79.
169. Id. at 467–71, 469 figs.1 & 2, 470 figs.3 & 4.
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housing.170 This particular situation is especially true in today’s
resource-constrained environment.171 Were HUD actually involved, it
could help in monitoring QAPs and projects and determine not only
what issues are problematic but also practices that work well.
Second, while the IRS does have expertise to track finances and
costs and understand the credit as a matter of its interaction with the
tax laws, it is also not doing this monitoring. 172 The major problem
here is that the IRS is not collecting the proper data.173 Furthermore,
most of the data collection is on paper, leading to delays and gaps if
the data is not entered accurately and in a timely matter into the IRS’s
computer systems.174 The result of this poor data collection and
management practice along with the resource constraints means that
the IRS rarely audits projects or HFAs and thus is unable to find the
sources of financial problems or good financial practices. 175 Thus,
often we do not know what factors are driving the costs of the
LIHTC.176 We are also often unable to find waste and abuse.177
Third, because of both the lack of the IRS’s monitoring and the lack
of outreach to HUD, the LIHTC can run at cross-purposes with other
housing programs.178 HUD works, as noted above, with other agencies
that address rental housing policy, such as the Department of
Agriculture on rural housing. 179 Indeed, it has even led a rental housing
policy working group that brought together many of the agencies that
deal with rental housing issues.180 But the IRS/Treasury were absent
from that group.181 The lack of communication and participation
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
SOME

Id. at 479.
Id.
Id. at 479–81.
Saito, supra note 10, at 479–80.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 480–81.
Id. at 466, 479–80.
Id. at 466.
JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION, supra note 162, at 34–36.
Mazzara, supra note 144, at 1; see supra text accompanying note 144.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-360, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT:
AGENCY PRACTICES RAISE CONCERNS AND IRS COULD IMPROVE NONCOMPLIANCE REPORTING
AND DATA COLLECTION 16–17, 44–45 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-360.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NJ9K-6YTX] (discussing the Rental Policy Working Group to align rental policies in
the federal government that HUD leads and where the IRS and Treasury are notably absent).
181. Id. at 17, 44–45.
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means that there is a lack of harmonization between these various
programs. There is also a concern that the LIHTC is not leveraged as
effectively to pursue a coherent rental housing policy strategy.182
3. Takeaways
The LIHTC provides some takeaways, mainly in the absence of
coordination at all. The major point is that not coordinating can create
problems. Coordination here could smooth over the implementation
and management issues. Coordination would allow this program to
work in concert with other affordable rental housing supply
interventions administered by agencies like HUD and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Coordination could actually also help to
provide not only enforcement but also sharing of practices among the
various states and interest holders like renters and developers.
Second, Congress putting some joint agency jurisdiction into the
statute likely would spur coordination. Agencies often do not
coordinate in the tax sphere unless there is an impetus from Congress
that highlights it. This issue may stem from a risk aversion principle.
Part of it may also stem from an inertia on the IRS’s part to coordinate
with other agencies if not directed to do so.
Third, external agencies, though they are not tax experts, should
have greater awareness of tax expenditures that affect them. The
awareness of the LIHTC as a problem in policy stems from the fact
that HUD, which already collaborates with other agencies on
affordable rental housing policies, knew of the LIHTC and its size and
importance. But many other social policy tax expenditures have no
statutory coordination directive, even if they are seeking to impose a
policy goal that cries for another expertise agency for the
administration and management of that tax expenditure program. And
that other expert agency may not know about this tax expenditure
because it is not an expert in the Code. Getting the IRS/Treasury then
to look more holistically at what they administer through the Code
could help provide clues as to when to engage other agencies and build
182. JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION, supra note 162, at 35–36.
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relationships in coordination, even if the statutes themselves do not
call for it.
B. ERISA: Working Out Coordination Later
ERISA183 regulates employee pensions and welfare benefit plans.184
The law is often seen as one where the IRS/Treasury, on the one hand,
and the Department of Labor (DOL), on the other, are meant to
coordinate. But the coordination effort stemmed from an awkward
shotgun marriage. A messy split led toward a decreased need for
coordination, but that left some gaps open in the regime. A limited
explanation of ERISA’s provisions is presented here.
1. Coordination by Accident: ERISA’s Enactment and What It
Does
The enactment of ERISA in 1974 was a political feat. 185 Neither
private employers who created the pensions nor many, though not all,
of the labor unions, really supported major pension reform. 186 It took
policy entrepreneurs in government and politics, as well as the failure
of the Studebaker pension when the company shut its plant in South
Bend, to get reform on the agenda. 187
To explain what exactly ERISA did within the realm of pension
plans is itself a massive undertaking. But some of the key ideas are
important for an understanding of this coordination matter. Before
ERISA’s enactment, there was little regulation of pension plans. Many
183. As used here, ERISA refers to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Pub. L.
No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108-5109, scattered sections of I.R.C. and
29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C. §§ 846, 1037, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-1).
184. See generally id.
185. Much of the discussion here is drawn off the work of James Wooten in his political history of
ERISA’s enactment and from the ERISA at 40 Symposium hosted by the Drexel Law Review, where
many of the original players came to speak. ERISA at 40, DREXEL UNIV. THOMAS R. KLINE SCH. OF L.,
https://drexel.edu/law/about/news/events_calendar/ERISA/
[https://perma.cc/7NWW-SEX9].
See
generally JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A
POLITICAL HISTORY (2004) (discussing the history of how ERISA was enacted into law).
186. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 7–8. Wooten notes that some of the major players in supporting
reform were two unions, mainly the United Auto Workers (UAW) and United Steelworkers. Id. at 8.
187. Id. at 8, 51–52. Interestingly, as Wooten notes, it was not that Studebaker misappropriated funds
from their plan, but they had underfunded their future liabilities. Id. at 51–52.
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people lost their pensions because of inadequate funding or failure to
meet long vesting periods. 188 ERISA then sought to regulate pensions
in exchange for the tax benefits of deferred compensation.189 ERISA
regulated pensions on four dimensions: vesting, funding, fiduciary
standards, and termination insurance. 190
First, ERISA required that plans have reasonable vesting periods.191
The goal was to ensure that employee-beneficiaries could work at a
certain employer or within a certain industry for a reasonable period
of time and still receive pension benefits even if they changed jobs or
lost their job.192 Before ERISA, many pensions had long vesting
periods.193 If one left a job one day short of that vesting period, one
would get nothing.194 Reasonable vesting timelines limited this
forfeiture risk.195 ERISA generally brought vesting standards down to
about ten years.196
Second, ERISA instituted minimum funding standards.197 Before
ERISA, retirement plans sometimes did not adequately fund their
pension plans. This resulted in the plan terminating and leaving the
188. Id. at 54–55 (discussing how generally UAW had plans where people would only vest upon
retirement to help increase the benefits that retirees received).
189. See id. at 4, 23–26, 29–34, 39–43. Wooten here discusses the shift from an idea that pensions were
merely for personnel management and thus subject to limited government regulation to a question of
worker security, whereby the idea is to “promote employee welfare.” Id. at 4. He outlines how pensions
started off receiving tax treatment, which put them on equal footing with normal compensation, but how,
as rates changed, they became a bit like a tax shelter limited to the top officials of various business entities
and thus Treasury’s desires to make pensions more widely available—if a company even had one—and
produce other regulation in exchange for the tax benefits. Id. at 23–26, 29–34, 39–43.
190. NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, ERISA PREEMPTION PRIMER 2 (2009),
https://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/ERISA_Primer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6B45-FRR6]. In addition, ERISA also regulated health and welfare plans of many
employers. It is often said that the health and welfare matter was an afterthought. Although it appears last
minute, it was not entirely so. See Symposium, Panel 3: Negotiating the Agency Peace Treaty:
Reorganization Plan No. 4, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 319, 331 (2014) [hereinafter Panel 3]. Instead, it was a
plea from some of the unions around legal plans to stave off attempts by the American Bar Association
(ABA) and attorneys to quash these sorts of plans. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 235–36, 258–59, 268–69.
Of course, at the time, health plans were not nearly as large as they are now, and this provision has led
toward confusion and unintended consequences. Id. at 281–85.
191. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053; I.R.C. § 411.
192. See WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 91–93.
193. Id. at 91 (noting Congress’s concern about forfeiture risk with lengthy vesting periods).
194. See id.
195. Id. at 93.
196. ERISA § 203; I.R.C. § 411.
197. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082; I.R.C. § 412.
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beneficiaries, both retirees depending on the pension income and
current employees hoping for a pension, in a lurch.198 To limit this
default risk, ERISA created a funding schedule to ensure that plans
funded current liabilities and amortized other liabilities over a
reasonable period.199
Third, ERISA created fiduciary standards. 200 The goal here was to
prohibit plans and the employers that sponsored them from engaging
in self-dealing to the detriment of the beneficiaries. 201 Here, ERISA
codified the concepts from the common law of trusts.202 The plans thus
had to be managed solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries, like a
common-law trust.203 The law imposed duties of care to plan managers
and administrators similar to the common law duties that applied to
trustees.204 It also created a set of prohibited transactions to limit
self-dealing.205 Plans, however, could apply for an exemption from the
restrictions imposed by the prohibited transaction rules of ERISA.206
Finally, to further limit default risk, ERISA created plan termination
insurance.207 Plans would have to pay into the insurance program,
which was managed by a new organization, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).208 Should a plan terminate, vested
beneficiaries would all receive a partial benefit based on the
insurance.209 The PBGC was technically placed in DOL but had not
only the Secretary of Labor but also the Secretaries of the Treasury and
of Commerce as part of its governance.210

198. Winston Du, Pensions: The Broken Promise, YOUTUBE, at 12:33, 26:34 (Sept. 12, 1972),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JT3o6Kmim8I (original video belonging to NBC Educational
Enterprises television broadcast).
199. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 96.
200. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
201. Du, supra note 198, at 37:53.
202. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 98.
203. Id. at 223; ERISA § 404(a)(1).
204. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 223; ERISA § 404(a).
205. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
206. ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a).
207. ERISA §§ 4021(a), 4022(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a).
208. ERISA §§ 4002, 4006-4007, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306-1307.
209. ERISA § 4006(a)(7).
210. Id. § 4002(a), (d).
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What is unusual is that ERISA, which passed in 1974, called for
joint administration of its provisions in the areas of vesting, funding,
and termination insurance. 211 Additionally, while fiduciary duties
remained the purview of DOL, in exemptions to prohibited
transactions, each application required approval from both agencies.212
This complex structure with an awkward coordinated system arose
because of the political jockeying in Congress. It was the policy
entrepreneurship of people like Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) and
members of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
and Representative John H. Dent (D-PA) and members of the House
Committee on Education and Labor that moved the law forward
through the various veto points. 213 These members, in particular
Senator Javits, spearheaded a public pressure campaign outside of
Congress to push for pension reform.214 But even with public pressure,
they had to deal with the fact that both the Senate Committee on
Finance, led by Senator Russell B. Long (D-LA), and the House
Committee on Ways and Means, led by Representative Wilbur D.
Mills (D-AK), were more hostile to reform. 215 Furthermore, both of
the tax committees did not want to lose their jurisdiction over
pensions.216 In addition, while the Labor Committees and unions
211. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/aboutebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa [https://perma.cc/U5XF-VQGB].
212. Id.
213. Symposium, Panel 2: Making Sausage - The Ninety-Third Congress and ERISA, 6 DREXEL L.
REV. 291, 297 n.10, 304 (2014) [hereinafter Panel 2]; see also WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 12–14
(discussing how Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) created an outside the Hill game to force political pressure
onto Congress).
214. Panel 2, supra note 213, at 304; WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 12–14, 157–69.
215. See, e.g., WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 130–31, 144–45, 179, 185–87; see also, e.g., Panel 2, supra
note 213, at 302–03, 304–06 (discussing the jurisdictional fights as well). Senator Javits drafted his initial
pension reform bill, S. 1103 of the 90th Congress (1967), to be comprehensive but also in a way to avoid
the tax committees. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 131. He avoided making any amendments to the Code.
Id. That said, the Committee on Ways and Means in the House could likely assert jurisdiction over pension
reform because it had a virtual monopoly on the issue. Id. Furthermore, Wooten mentions that the tax
committees were far more hostile than the labor committees. Id. at 144–45, 179. Wooten notes that indeed
Ways and Means Chair Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.) was not in a hurry to do pension reform, and when the
Senate Labor Committee’s bill went to the floor, S. 3598 of the 92nd Congress (1972), the Finance
Committee made a last-ditch attempt to take control of the bill and avoid losing jurisdiction. Id. at 185–
87.
216. See WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 130–31, 179, 185–87; Panel 2, supra note 213, at 302–03, 304–
06.
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wanted DOL to have the exclusive jurisdiction over the reforms,
businesses wanted either the Treasury and the IRS or the Department
of Commerce to have sole jurisdiction. 217
Thus, the odd joint jurisdiction of DOL and the IRS/Treasury over
almost every aspect of ERISA arose from this political posturing. 218
Congress achieved this end by duplicating the language in both Title I
and Title II of the law. 219 Besides consultation, the law as passed
delineated only limited coordination mechanisms, and Congress rarely
attempted to specify which agency would take the lead over certain
matters in ERISA.220
The result was chaos. First, even with the minimal compromise
reached, the agencies duplicated efforts. It was unclear which agency
had the lead over certain matters, and there were limited attempts to
draw on either agency’s strengths or expertise.221 Communications
between the agencies seemed ineffective. 222 This particular problem
impacted the area of prohibited transactions the greatest.223 The law
217. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 203.
218. Id. at 250–51.
219. Compare Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. I,
88 Stat. 829, 832–97 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1003, 1021-1031, 1051-1061,
1081-1086, 1101-1114, 1131-1144) (governing employee benefit plans under Title 29 of the U.S. Code),
with Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. II, 88 Stat.
829, 898–994 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108-5109, scattered sections of I.R.C., 31
U.S.C. § 1037, and 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-1) (governing tax consequences of employee benefit plans in the
Code). For example, Title I and II duplicate the minimum participation standards. See ERISA § 202, 29
U.S.C. § 1052; I.R.C. § 410.
220. WOOTEN, supra note 185, at 250–51 (noting that regarding vesting, the Labor Department (DOL)
would lead on regulations, and the IRS would lead on other points save prohibited transactions). Also, the
IRS would solely determine whether a plan qualified for tax treatment, but once in operation, DOL would
protect the benefits of the employees while the IRS would handle operations to qualified standards. Id.
Prohibited transactions would again be joint. Id.
221. As stated above, the final law gave most of the jurisdiction of reviewing whether a pension plan
qualified under ERISA for tax benefits to the IRS/Treasury with some communication between the two
agencies. Id.; ERISA § 3001, 29 U.S.C. § 1201. Once operational, if there was a move to disqualify a
plan, generally, the IRS had to contact DOL, unless the collection of tax was in jeopardy.
ERISA § 3002(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1202(a)-(b). Prohibited transactions were completely jointly
administered. ERISA § 3003, 29 U.S.C. § 1203. Finally, there was a sense to coordinate, but the language
is quite vague. ERISA § 3004, 29 U.S.C. § 1204.
222. Panel 3, supra note 190, at 320–21.
223. Id. at 320–22. Alan Lebowitz, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Employee Benefits
Security Administration, noted that a lot of the procedure here was foreign to the IRS. Id. at 320. For
example, Dan Halperin, who worked at the Treasury soon after ERISA’s enactment, mentioned how he
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required not just mere consultation between the agencies, but explicit
sign-off from each agency to allow an exemption.224 After the
IRS/Treasury approved of an exemption to the prohibited transaction
rule, DOL would then have to certify the exemptions as well. 225 This
duplication slowed down the efforts to provide exemptions for
prohibited transactions.226
Second, part of the problem was that the agencies themselves had
no real roadmap for coordination. The statute itself was vague on
coordinating by just telling the agencies to do it. 227 Also, much of the
understanding we now have about agency coordination was in its
infancy or not yet developed. Such a lack of understanding further
hampered coordination.
2. Creating Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978
The morass regarding the prohibited transactions led to a few
proposals in Congress to create a single ERISA agency, but they
failed.228 But a particular high-profile event created an impetus to find
a solution.
In 1974, soon after ERISA’s enactment, the IRS initiated an
investigation, with DOL, of the Central States Teamsters Plan. 229 The
allegations were that the Teamsters union used the funds in the plan to
give special loans to mob leaders who owned Las Vegas casinos. 230
The IRS eventually issued a letter saying that it was retroactively
revoking the tax-exempt status of the plan.231 That letter came from an
IRS district director in Chicago, but DOL seemingly did not know
about that particular action. 232 The action itself was a sledgehammer,
struggled to address some of the prohibited transaction rules. Id. at 327–28 (“And [the exemption
applications] were all big and every time I looked at them[,] I said, ‘I haven’t got a clue what I’m
doing.’ . . . And I just felt like every time I signed, ‘I’m going to jail in ten minutes.’”).
224. Id. at 320.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. ERISA § 3004, 29 U.S.C. § 1204.
228. Panel 3, supra note 190, at 326–28.
229. Id. at 329 n.14.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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likely hurting many innocent beneficiaries who relied on the plan. 233
Eventually, the IRS delayed the implementation of the order, and DOL
got the trustees to resign and move management of the funds in the
plan to professional companies. 234 But this event showed the
ineffectiveness of the agency coordination in ERISA’s enforcement
and management.
This mess and the prohibited transaction situation mentioned above
led the agencies to develop a plan to reorganize their responsibilities
and develop better coordination tools. 235 Apparently, officials at both
the Treasury and DOL sketched the plan out rather quickly over
lunch.236 Even with a few minor roadblocks, however, Congress
eventually approved the plan easily. 237
The result is Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.238 The plan
essentially divided up the regulatory areas in ERISA to give one
agency the lead on certain components with consultation by the other
agency. Thus, the IRS/Treasury generally took the lead on matters of
vesting and funding rules.239 DOL took the lead in the fiduciary
standards area. Importantly, DOL essentially became the main place
to address the prohibited transaction rules and exemptions. 240 Both
agencies maintained their general authority to enforce any part of
ERISA.241
Additionally, beyond the delineation of which agency would take
the lead of the regulatory space, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978
created two key coordination measures. First, to prevent another
Central States situation, the IRS will have to notify the DOL if they
233. Id. at 329–30 n.14.
234. Panel 3, supra note 190, at 330 n.14.
235. Id. at 320–22, 325–26, 329.
236. See id. at 322 (discussing the informal lunch over Chinese food that formed the basis for drafting
the general structure of the reorganization plan).
237. Id. at 323–24 (discussing some of the AFL-CIO resistance to some of the initial structures of
Reorganization Plan No. 4).
238. See generally Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app.
at 252, and in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978).
239. Id. § 101.
240. Id. § 102. The IRS did retain some authority to handle the regulations around the actual tax itself,
but not over what constituted a prohibited transaction or what prohibited transactions qualified for an
exemption from the excise tax, which was the penalty. Id. § 102(a).
241. Id. § 104-105.
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decide to revoke a plan’s tax-exempt status for failure to manage and
administer it for the exclusive benefit of participants. 242 Second, the
IRS/Treasury would have to notify DOL to give them a chance to
provide input or object when promulgating guidance that affected any
collectively bargained plan.243
Overall, the plan was a success. The plan assigned clear leads to a
particular agency for certain aspects of ERISA, which helped break
various logjams and allowed the lead agencies to develop greater
expertise on those particular sub-issues of ERISA.244 But given the fact
that enforcement could go through both agencies, significant
communication between the agencies continued.245 There was
significant communication between the IRS/Treasury and DOL, and
strong working relationships developed between their leaders.246
Additionally, both agencies, particularly the IRS/Treasury, built
structures to help aid in this coordination with people focused
specifically on ERISA matters. 247 Thus, although sometimes there
were conflicts, often the agencies could resolve them without resorting
to the Secretaries battling it out, or worse, going up to the Executive
Office of the President (EOP).248
Indeed, the success of Reorganization Plan No. 4 in creating
coordination between the IRS/Treasury and DOL in ERISA allowed
the two agencies to work with a new agency, HHS, as ERISA’s
regulation of employer sponsored health plans grew.249 The
communication and trust built up at all levels between DOL and the
IRS/Treasury helped keep operations running smoothly even with the
introduction of this new, large player.250
That said, there are still some issues with the coordination. One area,
for example, is in the realm of lost participants, so-called participants

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
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Id. § 103; see also Panel 3, supra note 190, at 329–30.
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, § 106, 3 C.F.R. 334 (1978).
Panel 3, supra note 190, at 333.
Id. at 331, 335–36.
Id.
See id. at 334–35.
See id. at 334–36.
Id. at 331–33.
Panel 3, supra note 190, at 331–33.
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in a pension or welfare plan who are lost to the plan administrator. 251
This loss usually happens as the result of people who have separated
from the employer or industry group sponsoring a plan and have
moved to a new location. 252 Sometimes mail is returned, but
sometimes checks related to plan benefits are sent and not cashed.253
This situation creates a problem for plan administrators who need to
ensure these people get these funds, which are often cash outs of small
benefits.254
The problem here is at an intersection between fiduciary obligations,
plan funding, and tax advantages of pension plans: the regulations,
guidance, and reporting that could aid in limiting this problem and
keeping participants closer to the plans then are uncoordinated. 255 This
issue likely arises because this particular issue overlaps the policy
areas delineated in Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, and thus no one
agency is taking charge of the effort.
3. Takeaways
There are a few takeaways from the ERISA situation. First, contrary
to the traditional literature, particularly in areas where tax comes into
play, Congress does not often explicitly assign jurisdiction to the
different agencies, and sometimes the agencies are required to grope
along and figure out their coordination. 256 Congress’s assignment of
agencies to a given regulatory space are often more haphazard and
bounded by committees, leadership, and political entrepreneurs than
one would like or assume.

251. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
LOCATING
MISSING
AND
LOST
PARTICIPANTS
1–2
(2013),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2013-locatingmissing-and-lost-participants.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG3B-N8T5].
252. Id.
253. Id. at 12.
254. Id. at 1.
255. See id. at 2–4 (noting the need for not only guidance on fiduciary obligations through DOL but
more coordination with agencies like the IRS, PBGC, and the Social Security Administration).
256. See TODD GARVEY & DANIEL J. SHEFFNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45442, CONGRESS’S
AUTHORITY
TO
INFLUENCE
AND
CONTROL
EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
AGENCIES
1,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45442/6 [https://perma.cc/F69M-QH93] (May 12, 2021).
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Second, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, while done under a tool
that is no longer available to the executive and agencies, 257 helped
make coordination work effectively by delineating clear roles for what
agency took the lead. It also ensured that in creating guidance and
enforcement, there were mechanisms for people in both the
IRS/Treasury and DOL to communicate effectively. 258 The clear
delineation and communication then provided a durable working
relationship.259 Sometimes when things, as they inevitably do, fall
through the cracks, problems arise, but overall, it works.
Third, an effective coordination relationship can endure, generate
future coordination, and even allow new parties to come on. As the
commentators noted, ERISA also governs many employer-sponsored
health insurance plans, and as more legislation sought to handle this
matter, the IRS and DOL also had to work with HHS.260 Indeed,
because of the structure of Congress and committee jurisdiction fights,
similar duplicated language in multiple titles of a law action happened
again; however, this time, there was already trust and a template to
build off and to invite other agency parties.
Fourth, it is important to build institutional structures within the
agencies that allow for coordination. As noted, ERISA and
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 created places in the IRS/Treasury
that were high level enough to help coordinate. DOL similarly created
places with leaders in such a space. 261
Finally, ERISA scrambles some of the stories here about who makes
the coordination and the dividing up of the regulatory space happen.
The stories discussed above usually have the President making the
decision, Congress choosing to parcel it, or a competition between the

257. The power was overturned by INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The authority of the Executive
branch to reorganize agencies came from the Legislative Appropriation Act of 1932, which also gave
Congress a legislative veto over all agency reorganizations. See Peter M. Mellette, Comment, Effect of
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha on Executive Reorganization, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 121,
132 (1983). The legislative veto was found to be unconstitutional in Chadha. Id. at 133.
258. See generally Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app.
at 252, and in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978).
259. Id.; Panel 3, supra note 190, at 335–36.
260. Panel 3, supra note 190, at 331–33.
261. See generally Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1978).
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agencies to claim the space first. 262 Here, however, it was agency
officials—working together—who determined the contours of how to
coordinate. Thus, the story of creating coordination itself can come
from unexpected dimensions.
C. The Affordable Care Act: Successful High Stakes Coordination
The ACA was one of the most recent large social policy changes
that came partly through the Code. 263 Providing a means for uninsured
people who could not afford health insurance on the individual market
the ability to purchase such coverage was key to making the ACA
work.264 The ACA includes a tax expenditure that helps subsidize that
insurance purchase for middle-income people.265
1. The Premium Tax Credit’s Role in the ACA
The ACA itself is perhaps one of the largest restructurings of health
care since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. 266 The ACA
expanded Medicaid, and it also provided a place whereby those who
did not qualify for government insurance programs like Medicare,
Medicaid, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or
receive significant health insurance from their employer could easily
purchase insurance on a marketplace. 267 These marketplaces set up by
262. See supra Part I.C.
263. Technically, because of the way the legislation developed, what is known as the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) is actually two separate pieces of legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. When referring to the ACA, this Article
refers to the PPACA as amended by HCERA.
264. See Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially
Repealing the Affordable Care Act, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2 (Aug. 2010),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FRQ-5VH7] (noting the tax credit was one of the key tenets of the ACA to make
insurance more affordable).
265. I.R.C. § 36B (premium tax credit (PTC)).
266. David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why
Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX
L. REV. 669, 669–70 (2012); see generally Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act
Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495 (2020) (discussing the ACA and how it has endured for over a decade,
despite high-profile challenges that made it to the Supreme Court (at the time of publication) and attempts
by Congress to repeal it).
267. Gamage, supra note 266, at 684.
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the states and federal government were called exchanges.268 To further
assist middle-income people in purchasing insurance on the
marketplace, the ACA created the PTC, which is a major social policy
tax expenditure program in the ACA.269
The PTC assists middle-income people paying for health insurance
premiums that they purchase on the exchange. 270 The PTC is an
advanceable refundable tax credit, meaning that even a person with no
tax liability can receive the PTC. 271 Because it is advanceable, a person
can receive the PTC before they file their tax return on April 15 of the
next year.272 This structure allows the federal government to remit an
estimated amount of the PTC in monthly installments to health insurers
to reduce the monthly premium a person pays to a health insurance
plan that they purchase on the exchange. 273
In determining qualifications for the PTC and the amount of the
PTC a person receives, there are numerous factors at play. Most
important are the costs of the plans on the exchange where someone
seeks to purchase insurance (a special modified adjusted gross income
(MAGI) determined by standard income tax rules, with some changes
outlined in the law) and the size of the family. 274
This structure contemplates tight coordination between the
IRS/Treasury and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS), a subagency of HHS.275 The IRS/Treasury play a major role
because many of the key qualifications for the PTC, like family size
and MAGI, come from the tax laws.276 Furthermore, the IRS/Treasury
are the source of the data generally used to determine someone’s
eligibility for the PTC and estimate the amount of the PTC that one is

268. Id.
269. Id. at 684–85.
270. Id. at 687.
271. See id. at 718.
272. Id.
273. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
274. See id. § 36B(b)(2)-(3); see also Gamage, supra note 266, at 687.
275. See Gamage, supra note 266, at 718.
276. E.g., I.R.C. § 36B(d)(1), (2)(B) (defining “family size” and “modified adjusted gross income,”
respectively, regarding eligibility for the PTC).
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likely to receive because those determinations generally key off a
previously filed tax return.277
Yet it is CMS/HHS that touch the exchanges and the various health
insurers on the exchanges. CMS/HHS receive the information about
the cost of the benchmark plan, which along with MAGI, is one of the
key factors in determining the PTC amount. 278 It is through CMS/HHS
that advance payments of the PTC flow to the exchanges to reach the
various health insurers.279 These advanced payments, made monthly,
subsidize people’s purchases of health insurance. 280 Also, the
CMS/HHS make the eligibility and amount determinations for the
advanced payments of the PTC.281
Finally, the IRS returns, at the close of the taxable year, to reconcile
the amounts advanced as a PTC with the proper PTC a taxpayer can
claim based on their income. 282 If the income is higher than expected,
then the PTC will drop, and the taxpayer may owe some amount of the
PTC advanced back to the government. 283 If income fell, then the PTC
will be higher and lead toward a credit against tax or a refund.284 To

277. There is a time lag in the PTC. For purchasing insurance coverage in the year 2019, people had to
enroll in late 2018 in a health insurance plan in the exchange. See Francine J. Lipman & James E.
Williamson, Reconciling the Premium Tax Credit: Painful Complications for Lower and Middle-Income
Taxpayers, 69 SMU L. REV. 351, 363 (2016); see also Davalon, 2019 Open Enrollment Dates by State
(Obamacare), EHEALTH, https://www.ehealthinsurance.com/resources/affordable-care-act/2019-openenrollment-dates-state [https://perma.cc/3L9A-5BVE] (Feb. 13, 2020) (noting most states’ open
enrollment periods to purchase health-insurance coverage for 2019 on the ACA marketplace expired on
December 15, 2018). But at the time of the enrollment period, they had not yet filed their 2018 taxable
year returns, which were due on April 15, 2019. IRS Confirms Tax Filing Season to Begin January 28,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-confirms-tax-filing-season-to-begin-january-28
[https://perma.cc/WM8N-BQ5G] (Aug. 30, 2021) (noting filing deadline for 2018 tax returns for most
taxpayers was April 15, 2019). Thus, the estimate of the PTC, which allows for an advance of the amounts
to subsidize the health insurance purchase, is based on the income information from 2017.
278. Lipman & Williamson, supra note 277, at 367–69.
279. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., HHS, & TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, OEI-06-14-00590 & 2015-13-029, REVIEW OF THE ACCOUNTING STRUCTURE USED FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PREMIUM TAX CREDITS 2 (2015) [hereinafter HHS OIG/TIGTA REPORT],
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-14-00590.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LE5-A2H3].
280. Id. at 3.
281. Id. at 6–7.
282. Id. at 2.
283. Lipman & Williamson, supra note 277, at 371–72.
284. Id. at 380.
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undertake this effort, the IRS then needs to have contact with the health
insurance plans on the exchanges. 285
For all of this to work, there has to be coordination on the
development of rules and regulations. If they work at cross-purposes,
the program itself would fail. Furthermore, not only are the rules and
regulations important but also there must be sustained engagement
across the agencies to trace information and funds to both ensure
compliance and evaluate programmatic effectiveness.286 Without
robust coordination, the PTC would fail to operate. And it appears,
given the high stakes and the key role it plays in the ACA, the
coordination worked.
2. Efforts at Coordinating the ACA’s PTC
The statutory structure itself envisioned clear coordination between
the IRS/Treasury, HHS, and CMS. Congress created at least a
moderately intentional mandate for coordination, which made sense
given the complexity of the matters on both the tax side and the health
insurance side.287
To that end, the IRS created within itself an office dedicated to
addressing issues around the ACA.288 Although the Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM) said little about the Office itself, one could surmise that
the goal was to help develop and implement ACA policies.289
Additionally, the Office likely helped in building collaborative
relationships between the IRS and CMS in matters of enforcement. 290
The Office was directly beneath the Deputy Commissioner of Services
and Enforcement and at the same organizational level as the Office of
Professional Responsibility and various Divisions like Small
Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) and Large Business & International
(LB&I).291 Furthermore, the IRS had a Senior Director for Operations
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
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Affordable Care Act who was in the Office of the Commissioner. 292
Though both the ACA office and the Senior Director of Operations no
longer exists, it seems as though it has left its mark in operationalizing
the coordination of the PTC and various other parts of the ACA that
relate to the tax law.293
The IRS/Treasury and CMS/HHS also worked together in
developing a set of regulations regarding the PTC and the advanced
payment of the PTC. The regulatory history shows an ongoing
engagement between the agencies in an iterative back-and-forth.
Though CMS/HHS moved first in starting to issue regulations under
the area, they waited for the IRS/Treasury to fill in more details with
regulations under I.R.C. § 36B.294 Furthermore, after the IRS/Treasury
proposed and then later issued the I.R.C. § 36B regulations,
CMS/HHS incorporated and cross-referenced these regulations.295
Relatedly, the regulation development drew on the expertise of each
agency by having the agency with the greatest expertise on a particular
matter in the regulations lead the drafting of those parts of the
regulation. The substantive issues of defining income and family size
292. Id. at Exhibit 1.1.1-1.
293. See IRM 1.1.1.5(2) (July 29, 2019) (finding no ACA office in the current Internal Revenue
Manual)
294. See Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,875
(proposed July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 156) (“Further, [proposed rulemaking for
eligibility determination for the exchange] will support and complement rulemaking conducted by the
Secretary of the Treasury with respect to [§] 36B of the Code . . . .”). The IRS also returned, saying
explicitly in the first set of proposed regulations for I.R.C. § 36B, “The Departments of Health and Human
Services and Treasury are working in close coordination to release guidance related to Exchanges, in
several phases.” Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,931, 50,932 (proposed Aug. 17,
2011) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. pt. 1).
295. See, e.g., Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans,76 Fed. Reg. at 41,882 (“Section
36B . . . specifies that advance payments of the [PTC] may only be provided for an enrollee who is
enrolled in a QHP [Qualified Health Plan] on the first of the month. As such, in order to coordinate
coverage . . . , we propose to establish that coverage in a QHP may only begin on the first of the month.”);
id. at 41,884 (referring to the Code in the context of determining that individuals may be eligible for the
PTC or cost-sharing reduction (CSR) programs “in situations in which minimum essential coverage
offered through an eligible employer-sponsored plan, as defined in . . . the Code, is determined to no
longer meet the minimum value requirement or be affordable for the upcoming plan year” (emphasis
added)); Medicaid Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg.
51,148, 51,150 (proposed Aug. 17, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 433, 435, and 457)
(referencing the Treasury proposed rule governing exchanges in the HHS’s own proposed rule therefor);
Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg.
18,310, 18,347 (Mar. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155-157) (containing cross-references to
the Code).
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and determining the reconciliation issues all fell within the ambit of
the IRS/Treasury as the lead agency with consultation from
CMS/HHS.296 CMS/HHS then merely adopted the IRS/Treasury’s
definitions and procedures.297 Alternatively, CMS/HHS led many of
the regulations concerning how to distribute the payments, how to
interact with the exchanges, what the exchanges needed to do in terms
of eligibility, and how to make the determinations for what constitutes
a qualified health plan. 298 Thus, the iterative regulatory drafting
process also worked because each agency took leading roles on the
places where it had the expertise.
Beyond organizational changes in the IRS and regulation drafting,
the IRS and CMS also continued to work in numerous ways to get the
PTC and the cost-sharing subsidies working. The two agencies worked
together to have an effective exchange of tax return information to
flow through the system from the IRS to CMS and to the exchanges.299
The exchanges then used the information to make eligibility
296. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.36B-1(d)-(e) (2021) (defining the terms “family and family size” and “household
income”), 1.36B-4(a) (2021) (outlining reconciliation procedures).
297. See, e.g., Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for
Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 18,313 adopting the Code’s definition of “family,” as appears in
I.R.C. § 36B(d)(1)); id. at 18,354 (adopting the Code’s definition of “household income”); Medicaid
Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg. at 51,150 (adopting
the Code’s definition of MAGI for purposes of making PTC eligibility determinations);
45 C.F.R. § 155.350(a)(1)(ii) (2020) (clarifying that the PTC and CSR programs use the same household
income and federal poverty level definitions, in line with those of the Code). CMS would also use IRS’s
rules in determining what amount of the PTC it would pay in advance to an exchange. Exchange Functions
in the Individual Market: Eligibility Determinations; Exchange Standards for Employers, 76 Fed. Reg.
51,202, 51,207 (proposed Aug. 17, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 157) (piggybacking
eligibility standards for advance payments of PTC on the PTC regulations). Another great discussion of
the process is found in a piece by Amy Monahan, Law Professor at the University of Minnesota Law
School. See Amy B. Monahan, A Partial Defense of the IRS as Health Care Agency, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L.
123, 137–41 (2016).
298. See, e.g., Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for
Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 18,313, 18,345 (setting out eligibility standards that exchanges must abide by
in making PTC and CSR determinations); Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377,
30,382 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. pts. 1, 602) (removing “coverage categories” and
relying on HHS); id. at 30,383 (noting pediatric dental coverage allocation matters will go off of
HHS/CMS guidance); HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,118,
73,165 (proposed Dec. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 153, 155-158) (stating that exchanges are
to determine eligibility for advance PTC program and to administer the payments with information
provided by CMS); 45 C.F.R. § 155.200(c) (2020) (requiring exchanges perform eligibility
determinations).
299. Lipman & Williamson, supra note 277, at 375.
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determinations and to tell HHS the amounts the exchanges should pay
to qualified health plans (QHPs) as a subsidy.300 There was also a
counter-flow of information back from the exchanges to the IRS to
assist the IRS in its administration of PTC eligibility and reconciliation
of the advanced PTC with the PTC.301 An amendment by the ACA to
I.R.C. § 6103 aided this exchange of information between the IRS,
CMS, and the exchanges.302 But there were significant efforts to work
together to ensure that the proper security procedures were in place to
exchange this information and that the regulations promulgated
reflected that.303 The smoother flow of information meant that CMS
and the exchanges could not only more seamlessly determine the
advance PTC payment amounts but also could have income
information that could help enroll people in Medicaid instead of the
exchanges if they had incomes below 100% the federal poverty level
(FPL).304

300. See, e.g., Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,879 (helping
exchanges get applicants’ tax returns and other financial information); Exchange Functions in the
Individual Market: Eligibility Determinations; Exchange Standards for Employers, 76 Fed. Reg. at 51,211
(serving as an intermediary between the exchanges and eligibility for various programs); HHS Notice of
Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,166 (noting exchanges tell HHS the dollar
amount of advance PTC to go to QHPs for each enrollee).
301. See, e.g., Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,385 (discussing final rules that
request annual report from exchanges regarding advanced PTC and noting that “additional
regulations . . . are expected to provide for monthly reporting by Exchanges to the IRS and an annual
report to the IRS and the taxpayer due by January 31”); I.R.C. § 36B(f)(3) (requiring exchanges to provide
the IRS with information); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-5(c)(1)-(2) (2021) (requiring monthly and annual
reporting by exchanges to the IRS and enrollees/taxpayers).
302. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1414(a)(1), 124
Stat. 119, 236 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6103(l)(21)).
303. See Exchange Functions in the Individual Market: Eligibility Determinations; Exchange Standards
for Employers, 76 Fed. Reg. at 51,214 (discussing working with IRS/Treasury to determine the proper
information security safeguards in IT architecture for exchanges in handling tax information, as specified
in 45 C.F.R. § 155.260(d)). Monahan notes that this setup, while complicated, likely had significant
efficiency gains. Monahan, supra note 297, at 141.
304. See Medicaid Program; Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 76 Fed. Reg.
51,148, 51,150 (proposed Aug. 17, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 433, 435, and 457)
(discussing a streamlined application process for all these various insurance programs). Also, to aid in
coordination of all the various health insurance programs, like Medicaid, CMS also changed the regulatory
eligibility standards and definitions for things like income to conform more to definitions outlined by the
IRS in its regulations under I.R.C. § 36B. See id. (using MAGI from the PTC determinations for Medicaid
and CHIP); id. at 51,170 (adopting “household income” and “family size” for Medicaid and CHIP from
the IRS’s PTC rules). The goal was to have coordination between all these programs. Id. at 51,156.
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Another way that the two agencies work together are in the nuts and
bolts of the payments. Here, CMS is the agency, with the exchanges,
that certifies the payments that should be made. 305 But the funds for
the advance payment of the PTC come from an account the IRS holds
for tax refunds.306 As a joint report by the HHS Office of the Inspector
General and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
noted, this method is complicated. 307 But it is likely the simplest and
most efficient means for getting these funds to the health insurers
smoothly.308 Thus, even in the area of payments, there is a coordinated
interdependency between the two agencies.
Overall, the result here has been pretty good. Most of the problems
with the individual market reforms with the ACA did not come from
the PTC or the cost-sharing reduction subsidies. 309 Instead, much of it
came from the failure of the internet portal for the federally created
and managed exchange, healthcare.gov. 310 That failure was not an
issue of coordination, but rather more of a problem of IT procurement
management and resources in that area. 311 Overall, though the
procedures and the coordination were complex, they worked and
continue to do so.

305. See HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,166 (noting
exchanges tell HHS the dollar amount of advance PTC to go to QHPs for each enrollee).
306. HHS OIG/TIGTA REPORT, supra note 279, at 3.
307. See id. at 8–9 (discussing the complexities of using the IRS permanent refund account and linking
it to an allocation account that CMS would then draw on after certification of payments).
308. Id. at 8. Other options were discarded because it would require CMS to change their accounting
systems or require the IRS to have greater connections to the Exchanges. Id. at 9–10.
309. That said, there can still be trouble in the reconciliation process. But most of these problems stem
from the structure of reconciliation between the advance PTC payments and the actual PTC claimed on a
beneficiary’s return. See generally Lipman & Williamson, supra note 277 (discussing the difficulties of
reconciliation and hardships that people can face if they owe significant amounts to the IRS).
310. Robert Pear & Reed Abelson, Insurers Claim Health Website Is Still Flawed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/02/business/white-house-praises-gains-on-health-site.html
[https://perma.cc/KY7Z-82J7].
311. Amy Goldstein, HHS Failed to Heed Many Warnings that HealthCare.Gov Was in Trouble,
WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/hhs-failed-toheed-many-warnings-that-healthcaregov-was-in-trouble/2016/02/22/dd344e7c-d67e-11e5-982302b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/E8JN-ACNB].
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3. Takeaways
The success of the PTC, even in light of the constant assault on the
ACA in general, shows tax coordination can work and agencies can
administer a tax expenditure program jointly.
First, the fact that the ACA was a signature achievement of
President Barack Obama’s Administration and a step towards
Democrats’ long goal of achieving universal coverage raised the
importance and salience of getting it right. Indeed, the PTC remains
one of the most popular provisions of the ACA, along with other
individual market reforms like guaranteed issue and community
rating.312 Getting the implementation, administration, and continued
management of the program correct had high political stakes for a
high-profile issue that was quite contentious.
Second, having institutional structures that foster coordination is
important. Given its sometimes insular nature, it was significant that
there was a separate Office right under the Deputy Commissioner that
aided in the coordination. The ACA Office was organizationally on
par with the IRS’s Divisions like LB&I or SB/SE.313 Also, a top
official working in the Office of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue likely helped. These factors made coordination with CMS a
priority and allowed some leveraging within the IRS itself toward the
coordination goal.
Third, the statute envisioning a coordinated joint effort between two
agencies helped to spur them to work together. The statutory language
of the ACA itself divided the responsibility. CMS would have
responsibility for paying and addressing the advance PTC to the
exchanges and, ultimately, the insurers.314 But the IRS would have to

312. Liz Hamel, Ashley Kirzinger, Cailey Muñana, Lunna Lopes, Audrey Kearney & Mollyann Brodie,
5 Charts About Public Opinion on the Affordable Care Act and the Supreme Court, KFF (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/5-charts-about-public-opinion-on-the-affordable-careact-and-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/7L2W-7HWU].
313. IRM 1.1.1.4(2)(j) (June 2, 2015), superseded by IRM 1.1.1.5(2) (July 29, 2019).
314. Questions and Answers on the Premium Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/affordable-careact/individuals-and-families/questions-and-answers-on-the-premium-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/8CBUBTYM] (Feb. 25, 2022).
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address the reconciliation of the PTC on the return. 315 A clean and
somewhat sketched coordination, with some relative clarity as to the
roles each agency played, likely assisted in the administration and
management.
Fourth, the development of the regulations was an iterative process,
where there was collaboration and discussion between the Treasury
and HHS that allowed the regulations to build off each other in a
cohesive manner. It also allowed each agency to bring its expertise to
the table and develop rules that made sense both within the tax laws
and within the various health care-related areas.
Fifth, the agencies developed an exceptionally strong information
sharing regime. The flow of information not only ensured compliance
but also provided information on the program’s operation.
Finally, as shown, the agencies started to work together on payments
and other more mundane administrative tasks up and down the chain.
That trust allowed the IRS and CMS to get closer to one another and
develop a sense of trust and familiarity through each of these
mechanisms. That likely still exists today even though the formal
structure of the ACA Office is no longer at the IRS.
Overall, this part of the ACA is a success. There are some problems
with some of the policy, but it is mostly not a result of coordination,
rather issues with the statute. 316 Additionally, the coordination in this
one part of the ACA likely helped build connections between the IRS
and CMS to work on other parts, like the employer mandate. Similarly,
work on other ACA components likely helped in the PTC sphere.
III. SMART PRACTICES FOR TAX COORDINATION
As the above discussion of case studies and the administrative law
literature shows, the most successful forms of agency coordination
require agencies to interact closely with each other. There should be a
315. Premium Tax Credit: Claiming the Credit and Reconciling Advance Credit Payments, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-families/premium-tax-credit-claiming-thecredit-and-reconciling-advance-credit-payments [https://perma.cc/C4A5-5DR2] (Feb. 24, 2022).
316. See generally Gamage, supra note 266 (outlining statutory interactions that cause problems in the
ACA).
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sense of working to create value for the common good and potential
conflict that is well managed in trying to leverage different views and
expertise.
This Section builds on the case studies and the other literature
presented in this Article, as well as work from public administration,
to provide frames as to how the IRS/Treasury can work with other
agencies to coordinate tax expenditures for social policy. There are
many factors that can contribute to the success of these arrangements.
The people selected for leadership roles are important, as is political
will. But setting up certain institutional structures and management
principles that encourage effective discussion, work, and conflict
between other agencies can increase the probability of successful
coordination of these tax programs and better overall programmatic
effectiveness.
This Part starts first by discussing institutional changes. 317 It then
talks about managerial and cultural matters within the IRS that could
help to encourage interagency coordination. 318 It should be noted that
what is presented here, particularly along the lines for managerial and
cultural shifts, are options. This Article provides a useful menu for
policymakers to consider what tools they may have for a particular tax
coordination situation.
The extent and intensity of tax coordination can vary, and a full
treatment of determining the proper level of tax coordination is
bracketed for later. This Article instead provides the highest bounds of
tax coordination tools. Some social policy tax expenditure programs
may not require all or even most of these tools to have effective
management and administration.
A. Institutional Changes
Perhaps what legal scholars should think of most when talking about
agency coordination is to consider institutions and their roles in aiding

317. See infra Part III.A.
318. See infra Part III.B.
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coordination and effective, rather than cross-purpose, competition.319
Given that power is generally diffused both within the overall
constitutional structure of the federal government and even within a
single branch of the government, having effective mechanisms for
coordination helps coordination succeed. This Section first examines
how Congress can improve tax coordination.320 It then talks about
structural changes within the IRS that can help aid coordination and
build the cultural shift discussed later. 321 It closes with how the EOP
can also help at a higher level, mainly through the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and OMB’s subagency, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).322
1. Congress: Statutes and Retooling
Congress is the source of the Code. As stated above, the particular
committees that have jurisdiction over tax laws are incredibly
powerful.323 Thus, the tax laws often become a locus for social policy.
And if they want, the tax committees can also direct or suggest that the
IRS/Treasury coordinate with other agencies in administering a tax
expenditure.
As Bijal Shah, Associate Professor at Arizona State University’s
Sandra Day O’Connor’s College of Law, notes, Congress itself
initiates agency coordination through statutory commands.324 Outside
of the tax expenditure arena, as Shah shows, there are numerous
examples of statutes that do exactly that.325
But in the tax sphere, Congress’s coordination is often sporadic or
undeveloped. That in turn creates problems because the IRS/Treasury
319. See generally Gersen, supra note 12; Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 12; Freeman
& Rossi, supra note 12; Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12; Shah, Uncovering
Adjudication, supra note 12; Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, supra note 12.
320. See infra Part III.A.1.
321. See infra Part III.A.2.
322. See infra Part III.A.3.
323. See supra Part I.A.2.
324. See Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, supra note 12, at 1966–69 (discussing how many of
these coordination statutes often direct agencies without the President’s involvement and thus insulate the
agencies from the President). Shah’s main point is that coordination helps Congress achieve its objectives
against that of the Executive. See id.
325. Id. at 1966.
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often will not coordinate unless the statute directs it to do so.326 As the
case studies show, coordination sometimes arises because another
committee, as in the case of ERISA, wanted to make a change, and the
tax committees sought to maintain their jurisdiction over the area. 327
Sometimes political salience creates the situation, as the ACA situation
shows.328 But some of it lacks clear explanation. Why the LIHTC
excludes any aspect of HUD administration is unclear. Furthermore,
when not commanded by Congress to coordinate, the IRS/Treasury
often fail to communicate with other expert agencies effectively, as the
LIHTC shows.329
Thus, when creating a tax expenditure designed to create outcomes
in another policy sphere, Congress should consider making
coordination between the IRS and the relevant expert agency explicit
in the Code itself. Congress should also write statutes that delineate
the roles and potentially identify an overall lead agency to be charged
with rules, coordination, administration, and program management. At
the very least, if full coordination and joint administration is not
possible or desirable, the statute should require a consultative process
between the IRS/Treasury and another expert agency, so this other
agency has some awareness about any tax expenditure programs that
affect its policy sphere.
One of the major concerns with having multiple agencies in charge
of a tax expenditure program is oversight matters. When too many
committees get involved, oversight can be complicated and work at
cross-purposes, similar to agencies. 330
But with tax expenditures, some of the concerns may be reduced
because of the special place of the two tax writing committees. Any
legislative changes related to oversight must go through those
committees. This unusual feature of the tax system and tax policy

326. See supra Part II.A.
327. See supra Part II.B.1.
328. See supra Part II.C.3.
329. See supra Part II.A.2.
330. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1693 (2006) (discussing the problems of
multiple committees having oversight in the context of the intelligence community).
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could then exert some level of control over the oversight process by
giving the two tax committees a level of primacy in oversight.
2. Changes in the IRS and Treasury
Structural changes in the IRS/Treasury can also help in this instance.
Perhaps the most important change is to create an office in both the
IRS and the Treasury Office of Tax Policy that serves as the central
touch point for agency coordination.
The best example of how a dedicated group of people in the IRS can
help with coordination arose under the ACA. There, an office
organizationally situated at about the same level as commissioners of
divisions like the LB&I and the SB/SE helped to run the coordination
effort.331 The office no longer exists, but it is likely that it helped
generate some of the driving force in planning the rulemaking and
implementing the ACA programs like the PTC. The office also helped
to create a culture of coordination. 332
To that end, the IRS should establish an office in charge of tax
coordination. That office should be located within the IRS
organizational structure in a place similar to the old ACA office. The
office could then work with the other divisions of the IRS to help them
establish interagency coordination efforts. Some of the key functions
this office could undertake involve encouraging some of the
managerial practices for coordination that are discussed below. The
office could thus help create joint line-level teams of employees from
the IRS and another agency. It could help to manage resources for the
interagency coordination, develop Memorandums of Understanding
(MOUs) in the coordination effort, and develop performance metrics
that reward employees who work well in coordination. It could be a
source of the ideas for information exchanges. And it could help to
develop these coordination policies and put them into the Internal
Revenue Manual (IRM), thereby formally creating some
accountability for employees and also sending a signal that
coordination is important.
331. IRM 1.1.1.4(2)(j) (June 2, 2015), superseded by IRM 1.1.1.5(2) (July 29, 2019).
332. See supra Part II.C.2.
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The office can also be proactive in seeking out coordination. It could
serve as a point in the IRS that looks at the myriad of tax expenditures
to see which of those have broader social policy implications. It could
then help contact other agencies to inform them of a tax expenditure
in their policy spaces.
Perhaps more important than the formal power of the office itself is
the message it sends throughout the organization. It tells IRS
employees from the top to the line-level that coordination is important.
Though often dismissed, culture and norms are often the key measures
as to how bureaucracies operate and aligning them can aid in any sort
of policy or rule.
Similarly, the Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy should also develop
a high-level contact point for tax coordination. This contact point
should reach out to other agencies within the federal government to
better administer social policy tax expenditures.
Although all of these new structures require some initial expenditure
of resources, the hope is that after working with and identifying
coordination partners, the IRS/Treasury can then begin to divide up
some of the work so that they are not the sole agencies responsible for
running these programs and understanding their effects.
3. The Executive Office of the President: OMB and OIRA
The third place for institutional change is closer to the Presidency.
Obviously, the President, as evident with the ACA, can spur and
provide significant oversight of coordination when it is politically
important. But directly below the President, the EOP, in particular
OMB and its subagency OIRA, can also help aid in interagency
coordination.
OIRA often serves as a coordinator in the regulatory process. Per a
series of executive orders, certain significant regulations must undergo
OIRA review before getting published in the Federal Register. 333 Tax

333. See Cass. R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1845–48 (2013) (describing the basic formal process of OIRA review
of regulations, including its focus on cost-benefit analysis and getting the perspectives of other agencies).
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regulations were traditionally excluded from this process.334 But that
exclusion has ended to some extent.335 Indeed, under the new rules for
OIRA review of tax regulations, OIRA will not only do cost-benefit
analysis but will also check if regulations create inconsistences with
other agencies’ actions.336 The new framework provides an
opportunity for broader agency coordination on the creation of tax
regulations, which can be especially helpful for some of these key tax
expenditures for social policy.
Indeed, the on-the-ground facts regarding OIRA is that its largest
day-to-day operational function is to help with interagency
coordination.337 OIRA gathers information from across the federal
government and other governmental levels, like states, and convenes
other agencies together during the rulemaking process to get their
views on often complex issues.338 If done correctly, then, OIRA can
help raise productive conflict and connection points between the
IRS/Treasury and other executive branch agencies that may have
additional expertise. The development of such touch points could help
generate further interagency discussion and could then reach outside
the regulatory sphere into relationships that can help with managing
tax expenditures with other social policy goals.
Further, OIRA sits under OMB, and OMB itself should undertake
an active role in tracking and managing tax coordination. Numerous
recommendations from the Government Accountability Office have
urged OMB to look at cross-cutting programs within the executive
branch to improve program management. 339 OMB should undertake
334. See Clinton G. Wallace, Centralized Review of Tax Regulations, 70 ALA. L. REV. 455, 471–75
(2018) (discussing the lack of centralized review and a 1983 Memorandum of Agreement between
Treasury and OMB that exempted tax regulations from OIRA review).
335. Id. at 478–82 (discussing the new framework for centralized review of regulations by OIRA).
336. Id. at 479.
337. Sunstein, supra note 333, at 1840.
338. Id. at 1840–43.
339. See OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE OVERSIGHT, supra note 73, at 23–25 tbl.1, 24 fig.6, 28–30
(calling on OMB to take a more active role in managing tax expenditures and reaching across agency
lines). See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-509, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: OMB
IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF CROSS-AGENCY PRIORITY GOALS, BUT COULD BE MORE TRANSPARENT
ABOUT MEASURING PROGRESS (2016) [hereinafter OMB GOALS AND PROGRESS],
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-16-509.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3RV-JNLZ] (discussing cross-agency
priority goals and how OMB can better manage them and produce better performance measures).
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such efforts to identify and connect key players for numerous tax
expenditures. OMB can also provide support for the coordination
offices within the IRS and the Treasury Office of Tax Policy. For
example, OMB can gather MOUs across the executive branch agencies
and provide them to the IRS and Treasury. OMB can also help make
the matter more transparent by publicizing the IRS and Treasury’s
MOUs. OMB can also provide additional support by providing the IRS
and Treasury with smart practices to manage coordination from across
executive branch agencies. 340
Furthermore, OMB itself works with agencies for the budget
requests to Congress. OMB can help track the resources used for
coordination and identify how they can create a multiplier effect,
whereby the sum of the resources exceeds the parts. 341 Additionally,
OMB should push for greater funding for agency coordination efforts
with the IRS/Treasury.
B. Managerial Tools and Cultural Shifts
As important as these formal matters are, informal changes are also
required to have coordination work. The IRS as an agency and the tax
world itself is somewhat isolated at times and shifting that mindset
would aid in the success of coordination. These managerial tools and
cultural shifts could help foster stronger coordination.
1. Trust and Intellectual Capital
Agency coordination is not about bliss and hand-holding unity.
There is always some conflict and competition. But the goal is to get
the proper balance of cooperation and conflict to reach a better
outcome. Two key materials are needed to make coordination work:
trust and the proper intellectual capital.
Trust is vital. Coordination between the IRS and another agency
cannot work without a baseline-level of trust. Trust in this context is

340. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1195–96 (discussing collecting and making MOUs across
the federal government more visible).
341. See id. at 1196 (discussing the importance to track resources used in coordination).
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best defined by Professor Eugene Bardach at the Richard and Rhoda
Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at
Berkeley as “confidence [in] the trustworthiness of another party [that]
is adequate to justify remaining in a condition of vulnerability.”342
Trust requires that members of each agency working to administer,
monitor, and manage a tax expenditure program feel that their voices
are considered, so they can honestly reveal resources, can commit to
the coordination effort, and can rely on each other to take the proper
course of action in the coordination. 343 Trust can also grow by showing
the other agency their expertise and through efforts of reciprocity. 344
The second key ingredient is intellectual capital. The term, defined
by Bardach, is a set of “agreed on facts, shared problem definitions,
and mutual understandings [that] not only [provide] a common basis
for discussion and [move] the players toward agreement on policy
issues, but [allow] them to use this shared information to coordinate
many of their actions.”345 Intellectual capital requires a set of shared
terminology, problem definitions, and goals. 346 Trust and intellectual
capital then have a relationship bound together. As trust goes up, so
does the intellectual capital, which in turn builds more trust.
Indeed, the case studies above show how these two factors are the
bedrock of effective coordination. For example, with ACA’s PTC,
trust and intellectual capital were almost required from the outset,
given the high profile of the issue. The IRS and CMS had to approach
the process with high levels of trust in each other because if they did
not, almost nothing would move forward, and the political stakes were
too high. In fact, the process of the development of the regulations
shows too that the trust and intellectual capital slowly grew over time.
342. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 252–54.
343. Id. at 254–55; see also OMB GOALS AND PROGRESS, supra note 339, at 13–15 (discussing how
trust is necessary to build an effective working relationship and bridge organizational cultures in a
coordination effort).
344. Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 12, at 195–200 (discussing in detail developing
a reputation for serving as the go-to agency on an issue and various forms of agency reciprocity that, in
turn, helps with agency coordination).
345. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 202 (alterations in original); see also IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY
MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 13–15 (discussing how there must be a bridge between organizational
cultures in establishing an effective working relationship).
346. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 202–06.
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The iterative process shows both the IRS and CMS going back and
forth to develop a better understanding of the other agency’s views and
then potentially incorporating those matters, when necessary, into their
own regulations.347 The process of working together on these
regulations iteratively led toward greater trust and a shared
understanding of the goals and the particulars needed to implement and
manage the PTC.348
With ERISA, trust and intellectual capital developed over time. The
process here was based on trial and error. Initially, the IRS and DOL
were thrown into a somewhat unclear and chaotic situation. There were
matters of false starts like the Central States Teamster’s Plan
incident.349 But even in this state of thrownness, DOL and the
IRS/Treasury developed a growing familiarity with each other. A
common language and communication, along with a push from above,
eventually led toward a formalization of the coordination in
Reorganization Plan No. 4. 350 The fact that two high-level employees
of the Treasury and DOL hammered out the plan over lunch at a
Chinese restaurant shows the level of trust and intellectual capital that
developed after the rocky start to ERISA.351 Without that, making a
good division of responsibilities with a need to continue to
communicate and coordinate would have been unlikely. 352
With the LIHTC, there is no trust or even a common ground between
the IRS and a potential collaborating agency. Indeed, the IRS has
consistently ignored attempts by HUD to build these efforts by not
attending various rental policy groups that HUD has historically
organized between agencies involved in low-income rental housing
issues.353 The almost total lack of trust and intellectual capital here

347. See supra Part II.C.2.
348. See supra Part II.C.2.
349. See supra Part II.B.2.
350. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 252, and in
92 Stat. 3790 (1978).
351. Panel 3, supra note 190, at 321–22.
352. See supra Part II.B.2.
353. JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION, supra note 162, at 40–41.
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means then that the IRS goes it alone in the LIHTC with problematic
results.354
Thus, these are two foundational elements for the IRS to coordinate
effectively with other agencies as a cultural matter. Developing them
requires a set of strategies and tools.
2. Empowered Line-Level Teams
One of the most effective ways to have a strong interagency
coordination between the IRS/Treasury and other agencies is through
joint teams of line-level employees. Line-level employees most
directly implement the law and provide service like revenue agents or
line-level Chief Counsel attorneys. In his studies of coordination,
Bardach noted that these line-level teams, when empowered, help to
make the coordination succeed through a process of trial and error.355
Although other matters like leadership and establishing the proper
institutional environment, as discussed below and above respectively,
were also important, creating joint line-level teams to deliver tax
expenditures for social policy could aid in better administration and
management.
First, the value of joint teams in administering social policy tax
expenditures stems from the fact that the line-level expertise is
available for leveraging.356 Each side can engage in conversation with
and learn from one another but refer issues that require specialized
knowledge to the other. This leveraging of the separate expertise
together creates synergies and develops the intellectual capital needed
at a deep level.
Second, working together in joint teams of line-level employees also
creates accountability. 357 Generally, bureaucrats like revenue agents
internally adhere to and take pride in a sense of professionalism. They
354. See generally id.
355. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 117–19 (noting the importance of self-managing teams of line
employees and how they learn from experience and develop greater flexibility to implement matters as
the coordination effort grows).
356. See Saito, supra note 10, at 494 (discussing how joint line-level teams could leverage expertise in
the LIHTC context).
357. Id.
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want to get the job done properly and do not want to let their teammates
down. That effect can create a level of accountability, and the
familiarity of working together allows them to slowly get to know each
another and have trust grow.358
Third, joint line-level employee teams provide useful information
and outreach for tax expenditures. These groups, working together, can
determine some of the issues with the current policy and should be
empowered to run identified issues up the chain for future policy
development. Additionally, in the area of social policy tax expenditure
programs, joint teams working together and sharing information
allows outreach to beneficiaries. 359 Working alone, the IRS is often
ill-suited to contact direct program beneficiaries for purposes other
than enforcement, whether it be renters in LIHTC units or those who
receive PTC. Such contact by the IRS to beneficiaries might frighten
them into thinking that they are under “audit” or some other tax
enforcement action. Allowing other line-level employees to work
together to engage with beneficiaries would remove the IRS as the sole
point of contact between the federal government and beneficiaries.
That would then provide additional information to improve the
program and its implementation.
These benefits are important, but when creating line-level teams,
some challenges are always present. First, given that coordination
itself is an exercise in iterative growth, especially when initiated, these
teams need to have some latitude to undertake trial-and-error
problem-solving.360 Otherwise, none of the generative conflict and
cooperation can actually arise. In particular, this requires the IRS to
shift from a very command-and-control model often reflected in the
IRM.
Second, the IRS needs to provide formal structures that encourage
coordination and creative joint problem solving in employee
performance reviews.361 Part of an agency coordination office’s job in
358.
359.
360.
361.

BARDACH, supra note 12, at 144–46; Saito, supra note 10, at 494.
Saito, supra note 10, at 501.
See BARDACH, supra note 12, at 117–19 (noting the need for flexibility).
IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 11–13 (discussing the need for
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the IRS consists of helping develop these types of criteria along with
assistance from OMB.362 This structure would provide formal
accountability and rewards for those who work in these joint teams of
line-level employees.
Third, the IRS should do things that allow for greater familiarity
with a coordinating agency. Those things could be joint trainings by
the IRS and other agencies of these line-level employee teams. 363
Co-location too can also help so that IRS employees working on a
particular matter can be down the hall from their teammate from a
different agency.364
The case studies in the end do not reveal much about joint line-level
teams, but a few conjectures can arise. The utter lack of such teams
likely exacerbates the LIHTC problems discussed. 365
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 explicitly contemplates at the
minimum a consultative line-level employee engagement. 366 Again,
one of the major impetuses for the plan was to prevent another Central
States type crisis by ensuring that the IRS and DOL are all on the same
page for actions like the revocation of tax statuses. But even more
could be done. Some of the issues highlighted above that have fallen
through the cracks, like addressing lost participants, could benefit from
more sustained and empowered joint line-level teams.367 These teams
could not only identify such problems but could also propose some
solutions that could go up the chain to get formulated into policy.
With the PTC of the ACA, it seems as though by necessity, there
are strong connections between line-level employees at the IRS and
CMS. The structure of the program itself not only required harmonized
regulations but also a process of information exchange, fund flows,
formal accountability and to have agency plans and reports provide such standards); Freeman & Rossi,
supra note 12, at 1193–94 (noting the need for formal policies to aid in coordination with other agencies).
362. See OMB GOALS AND PROGRESS, supra note 339, at 1–6.
363. See BARDACH, supra note 12, at 138–42; OMB GOALS AND PROGRESS, supra note 339, at 3.
Professor Bardach notes that joint training can help, but it needs to be targeted in a way to focus on the
needs of the joint line teams and help in collaborating and team building. BARDACH, supra note 12, at
138–42.
364. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 138.
365. See supra Part II.A.2.
366. See supra Part II.B.2.
367. See supra notes 251–255 and accompanying text.
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eligibility testing, and reconciliation that deeply involves both
agencies.368 The IRS has to provide information to CMS to pass onto
the exchanges. The IRS must transmit the funds to CMS from the
proper tax refund account. CMS and the exchanges must also ensure
that after the PTC is distributed in advance, the reconciliation process
runs smoothly.369 Without sustained contact, communication, and
work at the line-level, a scheme like these, even once regularized,
could easily cease to function. 370
Thus, line-level teams allow stronger contact between the agencies
down the chain. But in creating coordination, leadership is also
important.
3. Leadership
Although having empowered line-level teams working together in a
deep way is important, leadership is also key to proper implementation
of coordination between tax agencies and other executive agencies.
Leadership helps encourage the line-level teams to work together and
resolve certain conflicts.371
The leaders for the IRS coordination efforts must take a different
approach from normal leadership in the IRS. Typically, the structure
at the IRS is a top-down structure, as shown by the generally strict
outlines of the IRM.372 But command and control leadership in
coordination efforts is often less effective. 373
Instead, the IRS should seek leaders and top members of the
collaboration office who are facilitative leaders. Such a leadership
style seeks to bring together disparate viewpoints for discussion,
learning, and information exchange. 374 Leaders here often have not
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra Part II.C.3.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-220, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES USED TO ENHANCE COLLABORATION IN INTERAGENCY GROUPS 27–36
(2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-220.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKY6-9TAD].
372. See IRM 1.1.1.5 (July 29, 2019) (listing various offices within the IRS).
373. BARDACH, supra note 12, at 226.
374. Id. at 226–28 (describing how facilitative leadership works and the need for someone with a broad
background who is diplomatic in working with others). The other alternative is advocacy-based
leadership, which seeks to rally the two agencies to common purpose. Id.
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only good managerial skills but also soft skills. They listen and craft
compromises well. Additionally, if the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is similarly suited and politically well-connected, that can aid
in providing facilitative leadership. 375
It appears that leadership has had some key roles in the successes of
at least two coordination efforts. As noted by participants at the time,
in a forum celebrating the 40th anniversary of ERISA, a lunch between
leaders who had developed a good consultative working relationship
led toward the solution of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978.376 The
close connection and ties between the leaders, even after the
streamlining and reshuffling of the duties, helped to create a durable
structure that allowed the IRS, the Treasury, and DOL to adapt to new
actors later as ERISA undertook issues related to health insurance.
Additionally, much of the IRS’s implementation of the PTC in the
ACA likely stemmed from leadership, after it, Treasury, CMS, and
HHS finalized the regulations. During this time, the IRS had a
Commissioner, John Koskinen, who effectively turned around many
organizations before joining the IRS.377 His demeanor and general
experience with facilitative problem solving in complex and difficult
situations helped to smooth the implementation of the nuts and bolts
of the PTC as it was rolled out, and that also helped prevent a crisis.
4. Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs)
MOUs are thought of frequently as a legal tool, but they are
generally non-binding.378 What MOUs do more effectively is to serve
as a management device for coordination. 379
375. Id.; see also IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 16–17 (discussing
leadership and the need for top-level commitment in agencies and leaders in those positions who can
connect with the White House and Congress).
376. Panel 3, supra note 190, at 369.
377. Jennifer
Epstein,
Obama
Picks
Koskinen
for
IRS,
POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/irs-commissioner-nomination-095066 [https://perma.cc/4KVUTVG9] (Aug. 1, 2013, 6:01 PM); see also Lauren French, Koskinen Tapped for Worst Job in D.C.,
POLITICO (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:34 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/worst-job-in-washington95081.html [https://perma.cc/W7R5-84HT].
378. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1165.
379. See id. at 1161–65 (outlining the types of MOUs and how they aid in coordination);
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An effective MOU outlines how the coordination will operate. 380 It
can help to say what the IRS will bring to the coordination capacity
and what the other agency will bring in terms of resources and
expertise.381 It can also help show over which parts of the coordination
effort the IRS and the other agency will have primary responsibility. 382
In some sense, while not an MOU, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of
1978 functions in much the same way. There, the responsibilities of
each agency and what agency had the lead were clearly delineated, as
were the resources and expertise each agency would contribute. 383 This
setup created a relatively effective means for administering ERISA’s
multiple provisions.
MOUs then can help provide the proper framework and setup for
coordination, but they also need to be made public. 384 There are
numerous reasons for publicity, particularly in the tax sphere. First, it
allows others to exercise oversight over the coordination process. This
particular function is key when dealing with the importance of tax
issues, which have not only implications in the particular policy goal
of a tax expenditure but also in broader issues of the federal fisc.
Second, those outside of the agencies can see which agency is taking
the lead for which particular portions of that tax expenditure policy.
That then allows for mechanisms to engage the agencies more
effectively as situations evolve and thus management and policy needs
to change. Third, others can learn from the IRS’s coordination efforts
if they undertake it.
Finally, as the coordination effort develops and grows over time,
MOUs must be updated to reflect those changes. 385 MOUs then should

IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 25–26 (discussing how MOUs are often
important and useful as tools to show how the coordination works).
380. IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 25.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. See generally Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app.
at 252, and in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978).
384. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1195–96 (calling for more transparency for MOUs that
have broad policy implications so that Congress and the general public can track coordination matters).
385. See IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 26.
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ideally have a sunset and other mechanisms to require revising the
coordination effort’s structure.386
5. Performance Metrics
Another important managerial tool is performance metrics for
employees.387 This mechanism provides for internal formal
accountability that bolsters the informal accountability. Most of what
is involved is to ensure that employees are rewarded for two things:
effective coordination teamwork, whether at the line-level or above,
and the development of creative and innovative approaches to
administering these social policy tax expenditures in conjunction with
the partner agency. 388 The goal is to allow the employees in the IRS to
take some level of risk and to innovate together with their coordination
partners.
These types of performance plans and metrics should, of course, be
developed by the IRS’s coordination office that is suggested above.
Additionally, the OMB should also help in providing managerial
support on these types of metrics.
6. Information Sharing
For coordination to work, information has to flow between agencies.
Many agencies have their own set of rules regarding privacy and
disclosure of key information, but the IRS has particularly strict
requirements as outlined in I.R.C. § 6103. The section prohibits the
disclosure of tax return or tax return information unless it otherwise
falls under a specific statutory exemption. 389
I.R.C. § 6103 does allow for disclosure for the purposes of tax
administration.390 But that is often construed relatively narrowly, and
non-tax administration disclosure purposes then must be specifically

386. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1193–94.
387. See IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 11–12; Freeman & Rossi,
supra note 12, at 1193 n.287.
388. IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY MECHANISMS, supra note 69, at 11–12.
389. I.R.C. § 6103(a).
390. Id. § 6103(b)(4), (h), (k).
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listed.391 Thus, as noted above, HUD cannot then receive any
information the IRS has on the LIHTC, even though it is such an
important supply-side intervention into the housing market. 392
There are two ways around this problem on the legal side. The first
occurred with the ACA’s PTC. There, Congress amended
I.R.C. § 6103 to allow for disclosure of tax return information to CMS
and to the state or federal exchanges. 393 That allowed for the whole
process to get administered well and allowed the agencies to monitor
matters. It also likely aided in the PTC reconciliation process. Another
method is to have the coordinating agency gather most of the
information on their forms. When the person then claiming the tax
benefit files his or her taxes, he or she will put an IRS cover form on
top of a copy of those coordinating agency forms and submit it to the
IRS, which means that the key information is no longer tax return
information under I.R.C. § 6103.394 Statutory exemptions to the
general regime in I.R.C. § 6103 are generally better than the
workaround using another agency’s forms to collect the information.
But if congressional action to allow broader exemptions to
I.R.C. § 6103 for the purpose of tax coordination is unlikely, the
historic rehabilitation credit provides another means to share this
information.
Beyond that, there are important measures that must be taken to
protect taxpayers’ tax return information if Congress enacts a broader
tax administration exception for coordination. It is here that
information flows and joint teams of line-level employees can work
well. Part of the joint training should be about the complex inner
workings of I.R.C. § 6103. Additionally, the IRS and coordinating
agencies need to set up IT systems and other procedures for
information transfer, whereby there is effective tracking done on
taxpayer information received and processed. Sometimes, this system

391. Id. § 6103(i), (l).
392. JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION, supra note 162, at 27.
393. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1414(a)(1), 124
Stat. 119, 236 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6103(l)(21)).
394. See JOINT IRS-HUD ADMINISTRATION, supra note 162, at 33 (noting this process for the historic
rehabilitation credit).
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may even require the IRS to provide mechanisms for ensuring that only
certain pieces of relevant tax return information get transferred, like in
the LIHTC, where the total number of credits associated with a specific
project is shared and not every single entity invested in the project. 395
This investment in resources and infrastructure will likely lead toward
better management of these expenditures and an understanding of how
they work, and more work should be done here in envisioning how to
make such a system operate. Indeed, the ACA’s PTC example can
serve as an initial first cut in the exchange of information between
other agencies and the IRS. 396
CONCLUSION
American politics and political institutions will likely continue to
make social policy through tax expenditures rather than through
spending. But all of this stuffing of social policy in the tax law puts
great strains on the IRS and the Treasury, both of which are resource
constrained and lack the expertise. Well-designed agency coordination
can help in this dimension.
This Article by no means assumes that the world will magically be
made better and that coordination will be successful. On the contrary,
coordination is difficult. It often fails. Coordination also is a slog
requiring trial and error. But this Article provides a framework to
analyze and create agency coordination in the realm of social-policy
tax expenditures. It also hopes to spur on additional conversations
between tax-law specialists, administrative-law scholars, and
public-administration experts in seeking ways to do that.
Future work in this area should examine other coordination efforts
and continue to propose retooling. Additional efforts may seek to
uncover how coordination works in greater detail with analyses of
coordination tools like MOUs or even interviews with line-level teams
and leadership officials. This Article then hopes to serve as a spring to
help us better envision and operate a tax system.
395. See supra Part II.A.
396. See supra Part II.C.
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